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Preface
The Mars Exploration Study Project was undertaken by the Exploration Programs Office (now
the Planetary Projects Office) in response to the strategic planning initiatives of the Associate
Administrator for Exploration, NASA Headquarters in the summer of 1992. The purpose of the
study, as viewed by the Associate Administrator for Exploration, was to establish a vision for the
human exploration of Mars which would serve as a mechanism for understanding program and
technical requirements that would be placed on a precursor lunar exploration program being
developed by the Office of Exploration (The First Lunar Outpost). Emphasis was placed on
determining the commonality between the Mars and Moon exploration programs to help ensure
that total costs for both programs would be minimized and that the lunar program would not
contain dead ends which would be difficult or expensive for the Mars program to correct if both
programs are carried out sequentially.
The study team chose an approach that emphasized the important aspects of Mars exploration
without consideration of the lunar capability. Because Mars exploration is inherently more
complex than initial lunar exploration programs, it was considered important to identify the
characteristics required for Mars so the evolution of a FLO-like lunar program that would optimize
the programmatic interactions could be planned. The result, toward which the study is
progressing, is a coherent view of Mars exploration which is valuable in its own right as well as
being useful for the integrated programmatic view.
From the outset, it was clear that the Mars study would progress most effectively in an
atmosphere of openness to new ideas from outside of NASA. Although most of the study
activities represented in the work and in this report have been produced by NASA employees,
active interchanges between the study team and non-NASA researchers have been encouraged and
many "not-invented-here" concepts have been included in the study.
The workshop summarized by this report was held on May 24-25, 1993 at the Ames Research
Center. It gathered the NASA study team and a group of non-NASA Mars exploration enthusiasts
in an environment which allowed and even encouraged criticism. This report provides an
overview of the status of the Mars Exploration Study, materials presented at the workshop, and
discussions of open items being addressed by the study team. In particular, the design reference
mission (DRM) was reviewed and focused. The workshop advanced a DRM that significantly
reduces the perceived high costs, complex infrastructure and long schedules associated with
previous Mars scenarios. The strategy enhances the mission return, improves the safety of the
crew, and reduces or eliminates many of the obstacles associated with conventional strategies.
This review of the DRM is believed to be an essential step in improving our understanding of
technique, risk and cost. In addition, three teams were assembled to address issues of cost, dual-
use technologies, and international involvement. It was believed that the definition of the DRM
would allow these issues to be addressed in a more coherent manner.
The current phase of the Mars Exploration Study is expected to be complete in December,
1993, when a comprehensive technical report will be assembled.
This workshop was successful primarily due to the efforts of Nancy Ann Budden, who
coordinated the meeting content and logistics from Houston, as well as Geoff Briggs, Doug
O'Handley, and Larry Lemke at Ames Research Center who provided local workshop coordination
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and support. The Mars Study Team reviewed the manuscript with particular inputs from Stan
Borowski, John Connolly, Andy Gonzales, Lisa Guerra and David Weaver. David Black and
Mary Cloud at the Lunar and Planetary Institute provided support for the outside participants. This
paper is Lunar and Planetary Institute contribution number 820.
Michael B. Duke
Houston, Texas
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Section I. Mars Exploration Workshop II:
The Premise for Mars Exploration
I. The Premise for Mars Exploration
A. The Rationale and Objectives for Mars Exploration
In August, 1992, the first workshop of the Mars Exploration Study Team was held at the Lunar and
Planetary Institute, in Houston, Texas. It was the purpose of that workshop to address the "whys"
of Mars exploration, to provide the top-level requirements from which the Mars exploration
program could be built (Duke and Budden, 1992).
The workshop attendees identified the major elements of rationale for a Mars exploration program
as:
• Mars is the only planet beyond the Earth-Moon system where sustained human presence is
believed tobe possible.
The technicalobjectivesof Mars explorationarc tounderstand the planetand itshistory,in
partto betterunderstand Earth;and to understandwhat would bc requiredfor a permanent
human presence there.
The politicalenvironment attheend of the Cold War may be conducive to a concerted
internationaleffortthatisappropriateand may be requiredfora sustainedprogram. There
would be politicalbenefitsfrom a cooperativeprogram.
The technicalcapabilitiesareavailableor on the horizon,such thatcommitment tothe
program willboth effectivelyexploitpreviousinvestments,but alsocontributeto advances
in technology.
• The goals of Mars exploration arc grand, will motivate our young, benefit technical
education goals, and excite the people and nations of the world to excel.
In comparison with other classes of societal expenditures, the cost of a Mars human
exploration program is modest. Many of the benefits of a human exploration program am
indirect or intangible. Further analysis is needed to help quantify the benefits of Mars
exploration, so that compelling arguments can be made to the public and leaders of those
nations who might participate in a Mars exploration program, to justify the expenditures
that win be required.
Reflecting the conclusions of the workshop, the Exploration Program Office (ExPO) adopted as
the technical goal for the Mars exploration program: "Verify a way that people can inhabit Mars."
Derived from this goal are three objectives: (1) Conduct human missions to Mars; (2) Conduct
applied science research to use Mars resources to augment life-sustaining systems; and (3) Conduct
basic science research to gain new knowledge about the solar system s origin and history.
Conducting human missions to Mars is required to accomplish the exploration and research
activities, but contains the requirements for the safe transportation, maintenance on the surface of
Mars and return of a healthy crew to Earth. The surface exploration mission envisions
approximately equal priority for applied science research - learning about the environment,
resources, and operational consuaints that would allow humans eventually to inhabit the planet;
and basic science research - exploring the planet for insights into the nature of planets, the nature
of Mars' atmosphere and its evolution, and the possible past existence of life. These more detailed
objectives are shown in Table 1 and form the basis for defining the required elements and
operations for the Mars exploration program.
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B. The ReferenceMission
I. Purpose of the Reference Mission
The reference mission serves several purposes. First, it provides a mechanism for diverse technical
personnel to collectively integrate their definition and design efforts around a baseline strategy.
This allows people with innovative concepts to compare their approach on a direct basis. It is
particularly important to establish a set of mission accomplishments that must be met by
alternative scenarios. This is a major step in documenting the expected benefits of the exploration
program. Second, it allows the formulation of a technically credible approach, with appropriate
documentation of the technical and programmatic risks, which can form the basis for defensible
cost estimates for the program. Previous studies of Mars missions have been associated with rather
high costs, but with little visibility into the assumptions and approaches to developing the costs.
Developing the reference mission provides a starting point for cost analysis, which can identify
important programmatic or technical problems whose solution can reduce the overall cost and risk
of the program. Likewise, the reference mission provides a basis for analyzing the importance of
technology development and new data which can be gathered in advance of the human exploration
mission design. Finally, the reference mission provides a basis for understanding potential
cooperative approaches to conducting the mission.
Table 1.
Mars Exploration Program Technical Objectives
Conduct Human Missions to Mars
a. Land people on Mars and return them safely to Earth
b. Demonstrate the capability of people to effectively perform useful work on the surface of
Mars
c. Demonstrate the ability to support people on Mars for two years or more at a time
d. Demonstrate the ability to support people in space for periods of time consistent with Mars
mission opportunities (2-3 years)
e. Demonstrate that space operations capabilities including communications, data
management, and operations planning can accommodate both routine and contingency
mission operational situations; and understand abort modes from surface or space
contingencies
f. Determine the characteristics of space transportation and surface operations systems
consistent with sustaining a long term program at affordable cost
Conduct Applied Science Research to Use Mars Resources to Augment Life-Sustaining Systems
a. Catalogue the global distribution of life support, propellant, and construction materials
(hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium, magnesium and iron) on Mars and of
the Moons Phobos and Deimos
b. Demonstrate effective system designs and processes for utilizing in-situ materials to replace
products that otherwise would have to be provided from Earth
Conduct Basic Science Research to Gain New Knowledge About the Solar System's Orit, in and
a. Demonstrate the capacity for robotic and human investigations to gain significant insights
into the history of the atmosphere, the planet's geological evolution, and the possible
evolution of life
b. Determine whether Mars, the Martian system, or Earth-Mars transits are suitable venues for
other science measurements
2. Reference Mission Overview
The mission objectives of the reference mission adopted for this study include: (I) Define a robust
surface mission, supporting crews on the surface of Mars for 500-600 days. This is in contrast to
previous mission studies that have adopted short stay times for the first or first few human
exploration missions. The investment in the systems that are necessary to get humans to Mars is
large and similar for either short or long duration stays; therefore, the large benefit gained by
extending the stay time should be cost-effective; (2) Provide an operationally simple approach.
Because an integrated mission in which a single spacecraft is launched from Earth and lands on
Mars to conduct the long exploration program is not feasible, it is necessary to determine the
simplest and most reliable set of operations in space or on the surface of Mars to bring all of the
necessary resources to the surface where they are to be used; (3) Provide a flexible implementation
strategy. Mars missions are complex, so that multiple pathways to the desired objectives have
considerable value in insuring mission success; (4) The approach must balance technical,
programmatic, mission, and safety risks. Mars exploration will not be without risks; however, the
risk approach will be an important element in the acceptability of the mission concept to the public
and leaders.
The provision of a robust surface capability is basic to the reference mission defined in this study.
The surface capability provides a comfortable, productive and safe place for the crew. This, in
turn, changes the perspective with respect to previous studies. Whereas in previous studies, many
mission contingencies resulted in aborts (direct returns to Earth), another option exists in this
reference mission, namely, abort to Mars' surface. This allows the mission design to focus on the
surface capability, not on the provision of redundant systems to be used in the unplanned and
relatively improbable event of system failure in flight. The robust surface capability is
implemented through the split mission concept, in which cargo is transported in manageable units
to the surface and checked out in advance of committing crews to their missions. This approach
provides a basis for continued expansion of capability at the outpost through the addition of
modules to the original systems. The split mission approach also allows the crews to be
transported on faster, more energetic trajectories, minimizing their exposure to the space
environment.
The referencemission isdepictedinFigures la and lb. The 2007 and 2009 launch opportunities
were selectedforthisstudy because they are reasonabletargetdams fora program initiatedinthe
decade of the 1990's,but alsobecause theyrepresentthe most energeticallydifficultopportunities.
A mission designed forthose years willbe easierinlateryears. For example, where thetrans-Mars
and tmns-Earth crew transfers in the 2009 opportunity are 180 days, in the easier 2019 opportunity
they are 120 days each way for the same transfer vehicle design. In the fn'st opportunity, 2007,
three cargo missions are launched on minimum energy trajectories direct to Mars, without
assembly or fueling in low Earth orbit. The f'LrStpayload is a vehicle in which the crew will return
to Earth after their exploration, which is left in Mars orbit. The second payload is a surface habitat
and ascent vehicle. The third payload contains the crew's ascent vehicle and a mixture of other
elements of the surface systems and consumables. The ascent vehicle is landed dry (except for
hydrogen to be used as a reactant) and is fueled through production of methane and oxygen from
the Mars atmosphere. All are checked out and the ascent vehicle is verified to be fueled before the
crew is launched from Earth. At the second opportunity, 2009, the crew is launched. They land in
the habitat in which they have ridden from Earth, without a rendezvous in Mars orbit. After their
stay on Mars, they use the previously landed ascent vehicle to return to orbit, rendezvous with the
Earth return vehicle, and return to Earth. In the second launch window, two additional cargo
missions also are launched, which provide backup or extensions of previous capabilities. For
example, a second Mars ascent vehicle is landed and a second Earth return vehicle is placed in
Mars orbit, providing two redundant means for each leg of the return trip. Subsequently, one
piloted mission and two cargo missions can be launched at each opportunity.
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The major distinguishing characteristics of the design reference mission, compared to previous
concepts, include: (1) No low-Earth orbit operations, assembly or fueling; (2) No rendezvous in
Mars orbit prior to landing; (3) Short transit times and long surface stay times for the first and
subsequent crews exploring Mars; (4) A common heavy lift launch vehicle, capable of transporting
crew or cargo to space, and capable of delivering needed payload with a total of 4 launches for the
first human mission and three launches of cargo and crew for each subsequent opportunity; (5)
Exploitation of indigenous resources from the beginning of the program, with important
performance benefits and reduction of mission risk; (6) Availability of abon-to--Mars'-surface
strategies, based on the robustness of the Mars surface capabilities.
C. The Surface Mission
1. Surface Mission Overview
The principle was established at the beginning of the Mars Exploration Study that the technical
benefits of Mars exploration would be heavily weighted toward those things that people could
constructively accomplish on the surface of the planet. Although the trip there and back will be
rigorous and will require substantial planning and good use of technology to reduce risk, the vast
majority of the important exploration tasks are those that are accomplished on the planet's surface.
For that reason, emphasis in this study has been placed on the definition of the surface system. As
few previous studies have addressed these surface mission issues in depth, surface mission
concepts are not as advanced as space transportation issues. But the resolution of the surface
mission issues is essential also to the space transportation question, because they tend to dominate
the requirements for transportation of hardware and crew to Mars' surface.
(a) Implications of Mission Objectives
There are typically a set of difficulties that arise in defining and justifying a particular set of
surface mission activities. These arise from an interaction of what is desired versus what is
feasible. This requires that the final definition be approached either from both perspectives
simultaneously or iteratively. Both techniques will be used in this study. Probably, at this point in
the reference mission design, the set of surface activities is too demanding, and will have to be
scaled back somewhat. The fast step in this process is to analyze in more detail the implications of
the mission objectives that have been adopted (Table 1).
(1) Conduct human missions to Mars
From the point of view of the surface mission, this implies that the capability for humans to live
and work effectively on the surface of Mars must be demonstrated, with several sub-objectives.
These include defining a set of tasks of value for humans to perform on Mars and providing the
tools to carry out the tasks; supporting the humans with highly reliable systems; providing a risk
environment that will maximize the probability of accomplishing mission objectives; and
providing both the capability and the rationale to continue the surface exploration beyond the first
mission. This then requires a set of functional capabilities on the surface, including habitats,
surface mobility systems, and supporting systems such as power and communications systems.
(2) Conduct applied science research to use Mars resources to augment life-sustaining
systems
This objective will require that an assessment be made of the location and availability of specific
resources, such as water, and that effective systems designs be developed and demonstrated to
extract and utilize indigenous resources, including operating the systems beneficially. As
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demonstrations, there arc opportunities to use indigenous resources in the life support system, in
energy systems as fuel or energy storage, and as propellant for spacecraft. These may develop into
essential systems for the preservation of the outpost as the outpost evolves. To the support
facilities identified in the previous paragraph must be added exploration systems (orbital or
surface), resource extraction and handling systems and additional systems for recycling water and
air and producing food.
(3) Conduct basic science research to gain new knowledge about the solar sysmm's origin
and history
This will require that a variety of scientific explorations and laboratory assessments be carried out
on the surface of Mars, both by humans and robots. The science problems will not be assessed
completely at any one site, so this requirement implies considerable crew member mobility and
transportation systems to support exploration, as well as the specialized tools required outside the
outpost to collect and document materials and the facilities inside the outpost to perform analyses.
(4) Surface System Definition Philosophy - Safety Philosophy
The ability to define a robust surface capability that supports the reference mission objectives
re,quires that a design approach be accepted which balances performance, risks, and costs. It is
evident that the priorities that must be established for the surface mission, as for the entire mission
arc: (1) The health and safety of the crew is the top priority for all mission elements and
operations; Life-critical systems are those absolutely required to insure the crew's survival. Life-
critical systems will have two backup levels of functional redundancy; if the first two levels fail,
the crew will not be in jeopardy, but will not be able to complete all mission objectives; (2)
Completing the mission as defined, to a satisfactory and productive level(mission-critical).
Mission critical objectives will have one backup level; and (3) Completing additional, possibly
unpre.dicted (mission-discretionary) tasks which add to the total productivity of the mission.
Mission discretionary systems will not jeopardize the crew if they fail, but need not have a backup.
The backup systems may be provided by either real redundancy (multiple systems of the same
type) or functional redundancy (systems of different type which provide the required function).
Recoverabilityor repairabilityby thecrew willprovide yet additionalsafetymargins.
This riskapproach provides a framework fordefiningtheoverallsurfacesystem, which isrobust
with respectto safetyand performance. The strategyadopted forthe principalLife-Critical
systems of thereferencemission isshown in Table 2.
Table 2.
Principal Functions of Life-Critical Systems and Safety Strategy
Habitable volume
Air and water
Primary
Habitat #1
Life Support System #1
Power Unit #1
Backup #I
Habitat #2
Life Support System #2
Power Unit #2
Backup #2
Pressurized Rover
Consumable Cache
Power Power Unit #3
Food/food Supply #1 Supply #2 Emergency Supply
preservation
In the reference mission, a habitat and pressurized rover are delivered and checked out prior to the
departure of the crew on the first human mission. The crew arrive in a second habitat. Each
habitat is equipped with a life support system capable of providing for the entire crew for the
duration of their surface stay. The concept of a life-support cache (Figure 2) is derivative from the
objective/assumption that indigenous resources will be extracted and utilized in the strategy from
the beginning of the program. The reference mission thereby utilizes a system to produce methane,
oxygen and other consumables from Martian resources, and verifying these caches prior to the
crew departing from Earth. In the reference mission, all food is brought from Earth. An
experimental bioregenerative life support system capable of producing a small amount of food is
included as a mission-critical element; however, the crew will not depend on it for their
sustenance. In earlier versions of the reference mission, an energy cache was considered as the
second backup to the power system. However, such a backup apparently requires too large an
initial power system, if it is to be manufactured on the required schedule, and has therefore been
replaced by a redundant power system.
2. Principal Elements of the Surface Mission
(a) Surface Mission Objectives
(1) Science Objectives
The principal science objectives for Mars exploration is determining:
• Is Mars a home for life - in the past, present or future?
This set of objectives will combine field and laboratory investigations in geology, paleontology,
biology and chemistry. The underlying assumption is that these problems will not have been
solved by previous robotic Mars exploration programs and the optimum manner to solve them is
through judicious use of humans at Mars as field geologists and laboratory analysts.
• What arc the origins of the planet Mars and what does it tell us about Earth?
This set of objectives involve geology and geophysics, atmospheric science, meteorology and
climatology, and chemistry. They will also require iterative sampling of geological units as well as
monitoring of a global network of meteorological stations. The global network will most likely be
established by robotic elements of the program.
• What resources are available on Mars?
The location and general accessibility of resources on Mars will be determined by the series of
robotic missions; however, in detail, understanding the extent and utility of the resources may
require the presence of humans. The fu'st missions will require that resources be extracted only
from the atmosphere, which is well-enough known for that purpose. Subsequent missions may
utilize other resources, including indigenous water. The resource discovery and verification of
accessibility will require investigations in geology, atmospheric science and chemistry.
The targeted investigations to be carried out from the Mars outpost depend on an increasing range
of accessibility from the outpost by humans and automated rover/sample collectors. A general
geological map of the region of the outpost site should have been prepared by robotic missions
prior to selecting and occupying the initial site. Field investigations carried out by crews on Mars
will address detailed questions requiring access to varied terrain and rock types. The reference
mission includes provision for two pressurized rovers, eventually allowing traverses of up to 500
9
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kilometers range from the outpost. It also includes three smaller, instrumented rovers which can be
teleoperated as necessary to document and collect samples for analysis in the outpost laboratory or
for return to Earth.
(2) Habitation objectives
The habitation objectives of the Mars outpost include:
Insuring that Martian habitability is not fundamentally limited by uniquely Martian
characteristics such as low gravity, absence of a magnetic field, soil toxicity, or the
radiation environment.
Demonstrate that self-sufficiency can be achieved on the local scale of a Mars base. This
includes the provision of a reasonable quality of life and reasonably low risk for the
human crews.
• Implementation of an experimental biologically regenerative life support system.
• Determine the potential for expansion of base capabilities using indigenous resources.
• Investigate the biological adaptation to Mars over multiple generations of representative
plant, animals and microbial species.
• Assay the volatile inventory of Mars to identify regions where they are readily available
to humans.
These habitation objectives are aimed at establishing the feasibility and approach required to move
beyond the exploratory phase toward the development of long-term activities on the planet. They
influence the selection of elements that are included in the surface systems, including habitats,
mobility, life support, power and communications systems.
(b) Surface Mission Timelines
A possible timeline for the surface mission is shown in Figure 3. This timeline is illustrative of the
considerations that must go into defining logistics and capabilities of the crew on the surface. It
represents the current level of thinking on the surface strategy to be employed. Key considerations
for this effort include: (1) The size of the crew. For the reference mission, a crew of 6 has been
adopted. (2) The length of the surface stay. Six hundred days has been accepted as the reference
mission baseline. This is consistent with the capabilities of the reference transportation system
strategy, in which crew transit times are between 120 and 180 days. (3) The mobility available. It
is assumed that two pressurized rovers are available. These could allow traverses to distances of
500 kilometers from the outpost, when confidence in the systems and operations had been gained.
(4) The allocation of crew time to external activities (Extra-habitat activity = EllA) and internal
habitat activities (IHA). The assumption is that each time an exploration sortie is made that
considerable post-sortie analysis and planning would be undertaken before the next sortie. (5) The
amount of time required for maintenance and repair. This is a key consideration and a technology
driver for these missions. To the extent that crew time is used for maintenance and repair, it will
not be available for productive exploration and analysis. (6) Provisions for emergencies. For
example, the possibility that a solar particle event will interfere with planned activities must be
considered. (7) Overhead, recreational, and defined physical conditioning time must also be
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100 daysAnalysis
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Clean Suit (X 20)
Stow Suit, Equip
Inspect Vehicle
Secure for night
(Sleep, eat, clean
hygiene, etc.
_covered)
Week Off
Sys Shutdown 60 clays
Departure Prep
3 Crew X 7 hr X 10 Days =
210 hrs total
Example of Mars Surface Crew Time Allocation
Adapted from Roger Arno, Space Projects Division, NASA-Ames
Figure 3. Example of Mars Surface Mission Crew Time Allocation -- [M. Cohen]
(Note: This calculation was based on a crew of eight while the reference mission uses a crew of six)
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considered. These are reasonably well understood, except for the amount of exercise needed to
maintain fitness in a I/3-g environment. These amounts of time are also dependent on what is
needed to maintain optimum levels of crew performance.
(c) Human Factors and Crew Size
Humans are the most valuable mission asset for the Mars exploration program, and must not
become the weak link. The requirement that humans spend on the order of 600 days on the surface
places unprecedented requirements on the people and their supporting systems. Once committed
to the mission on launch from Low Earth Orbit, the crew must be prepared to complete the full
mission without further resupply from Earth. Their resources are either with them or have already
been delivered to or produced on Mars. No further resupply is available and return to Earth in
substantially less time than the nominal mission is not possible. Crew self-sufficiency is required
because of the long duration of their mission and by the fact that their distance from Earth impedes
or makes impossible communications and control from Earth. The crews therefore need their own
resources (skills, training) and specialized support (systems) to meet the new challenges of the
missions. However, unlimited resources can not be provided within the constraints of budgets and
mission performance, so tradeoffs must be made between cost and comfort, as well as performance
and risk. Because the objectives of the missions are to learn about Mars and its capability to
support humans in the future, there will be minimum level of accomplishment below which a
viable program is not possible. Survival of humans on the trip them and back is an insufficient
program objective.
Basic human survival factors for the crew include adequate shelter, including radiation protection;
breathable, controlled, uncontaminated atmosphere (in habitats, suits, and pressurized rovers), food
and water, medical services, psychological support, and waste management. In the 4-6 month
transits to Mars, the chief problems will be on maintaining interpersonal relationships needed for
crew productivity, and maintaining physical and mental conditioning in preparation for the surface
mission. On the surface, the focus of crew concerns will turn to their productivity in a new and
hazardous environment. The transit environment is likely to be a training and conditioning
environment, the surface environment is where the mission-critical tasks will be done. Mental
health as well as physical health will be crucial to accomplishing the mission.
Within theseparameters,therearea number of areasthatwillrequireattention(Table3). These
aregenerallywell known as questions;what isnot as clearishow seriousmany of them areas
problems,and how much effortisrequiredtoreduce theriskstheypresentto the mission to
acceptablelevels.For a thorough analysisof the issuesinvolved,see NASA Advisory Council
Aerospace Medicine Advisory Committee (1992).
For long-durationmissions,with inevitablyhigh stresslevels,the trade-offbetween costand crew
comfort must be weighed with specialcare. The development of high qualityhabitatsand
environmental design featuresarecriticalto assuagingstressand increasingcrew comfort
conditionsthatwillgreatlyincreasethelikelihoodof mission success. Providing littlemore than
the capabilityto surviveinvitesmission failure.
Not allamenitiesneed be provided on thefirstmission. The program should be viewed as a
sequence of stepswhich, over time,willincreasethe amount of physicalspace on the surface,
increasethe amount of freetime by thecrew, increasetheamount of crew autonomy, improve the
qualityof food,increaseaccesstoprivacy,increasethe qualityand quantityof communications
with Earth. In addition,experiencein Mars surfaceoperationsmay reduce some of the stresses
associatedwith the unfamiliarityof the environment.
The quality of life can be facilitated by access to indigenous resources. In the near term, use of
indigenous resources reduces some of the mission risks (creation of caches, use of local resources
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for radiationshielding). In the long term, use of local resources may allow more rapid expansion
of usable space. Achieving the capability to produce water and oxygen may have physical and
psychological benefits over continued recycling. For example, reducing limitations on water
utilization for hygiene purposes will be psychologically supportive. The ability to grow food on
site also has a psychological effectiveness. The psychological impacts of these developments is
difficult to quantify, however real the effects may be.
Table 3.
Human Factors Study Topics*
1. Shelter/air
2. W_te_
3. Food
4. Health monitoring and maintenance
5. Psychelo_eal __mpoct
6. Communica_ons
7. g_, _la_afion and sleep
8. Crew factors (size, skill mix, organization)
9. Crew autonomy
10. Privacy
11. Leisure, recreation and entertainment
12. Adaptation to gravity variations
13. Exercise
14. Human-machine and automation interaction
15. Human-robotic pratership
*For description of topics, see: Clearwater, Y. and Harrison, A. (1990), Crew Support for an Initial Mars
Expedition, Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 43, pp. 513-518.
The number of crew to be taken to Mars is an extremely important parameter for mission design,
as many of the systems used (e.g. habitats) will scale directly to the number of crew. A progress
report was given on the Ames Research Center's study of the minimal size crew needed to achieve
the combined science and habitability objectives of the Mars surface mission. For this study it was
assumed that crew health and safety axe of fu'st priority in successfully achieving the mission
objectives and that the surface system design requirements for operability, self-monitoring,
maintenance and repair will be consistent with the identified minimum number of crew persons.
This was done in a top-down manner (objectives=>functions=>skills=>number of crew
members+system requirements) as the systems have not been defined in a bottoms-up manner
based on an operational analysis of the system.
A workload analysis was carriedout assuming thatthe crew'savailabletime would be spent either
inscientificendeavors or inhabitation-relatedtasks.Itwas assumed thatindividualshave
weekday schedules similarto a normal liferegime:
Sleep 8 hours
Hygiene 1 hour
Meals 2 hours
Exercise 1 hour
Rest and Relaxation 3 hours
Work 9 hours
The crew was assumed to have weekends free from work, except for essential tasks and chores
which could be carried out in less than 5 hours per crew member. From these analyses, lists of
required skills were developed, which are generalized in Figure 4. At a summary level, the five
most relevant technical fields required by the exploration and habitation requirements include
mechanical engineer,electricaland electronicsengineer,geoscientist,lifescientist,and
physician/psychologist.Itisassumed thattheseare Importantenough thatthey should be
representedby a specialist,with atleastone othercrew person being cross-trainedas a backup.
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A wide varietyof taskswouldhaveto behandled by each crew member, including support tasks as
well as tasks of command and communications. It is assumed that technical individuals would be
cross-trained for these responsibilities.
The resultof the functionalanalysisindicatesthatthe surfacemission can be conducted with a
minimum crew sizeof five,based on technicalskillsrequired.However, lossor incapacitationof
one or more crew could significantlyjeopardizemission success. Therefore,a minimum crew size
of seven or eightmay be requiredto addresstheriskissues.Currently,thereferencemission is
builton the assumption of a crew of six.
There isan immature understandingof themanner in which the crew would be supported by
intelligentrobots and automated systems. The work loadanalysisindicatesthatthe totalamount of
time spentin the field(on EHA by footor ina rover)by a crew scientistwillbe 10-20% of the
amount of theirtime on Mars. Thus, itappears thatautomated or telcoperatedrovers,capable of
extending theeffectivefieldtime by crew members, willbca good investment from the pointof
view of totalmission productivity.Progress being made currentlyin teleroboticoperationsof a
rover in the Antarcticenvironment can be translatedirectlyto Mars explorationcapability.
(d) Mars Surface Habitat
The Mars surface habitat must provide for the safety and health of the Mars crew for 600 days on
the surfaceaswell as providingoperationalcapabilityforconducting both IHA and EHA tasks.
The habitationcapabilitywillbe unprecedented inthe space arena and has littleprecedent on
Earth. The level of experience and theoretical understanding is small. However, it is clear that the
maintenance of human physical and psychological health for a long-duration mission of this type
must be given higher priority than for other space missions, if only because there is no escape once
the mission has been entered. More specifically, the habitat element must:
• Provide an appropriate living and working environment
This requires that it be demonstrated that people can effectively live and work on the surface of
Mars for extended periods of time, both in and outside of the habitat. Habitability of the surface
systems, their interconnectability, and the effectiveness of the support systems to control the
environment are critical. The supporting systems must work reliably for the duration of the crew's
surface mission, to maintain a livable environment, and maintain effective crew performance for
that period of time. The risks must be shown to be acceptable, and the operations capabilities -
including communications, command, and control, data management and local operations planning
- must be able to accommodate both routine and contingency/emergency operations.
• Develop the capability touse Mars resourcestoreduce the dependence on Earth supply
Sources of n_ resources must be located in places where they arc accessible to the outpost.
The most needed resources are consumables (N2, 02, H20). Once found, processes must be
developed to extract them, separate and purify those to be used, and deliver them to the habitat or
other places of use.
• Provide a set of systems which can sustain humans in a reasonably Earth-like
environment
These systems include a life support systems capable of maintaining crews for the mission duration
and beyond, in the case of failure of the crew to be able to return to Earth on the planned schedule.
This can be augmented by experimental systems, such as the bioregenerative life support system.
• Provide caches of consumables on the Mars surface
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These are required prior to arrival of the crew, therefore they must be created by automated
devices; however, they will continue to be replenished and possibly increased during the crew's
visit.
• Provide safety, reliability and robustness through functional redundancy of the support
systems.
• Allow ready access to the surface for undertaking exploration objectives.
A further requirement on the surface architecture is that the system be expandable to allow the
assets launched on three consecutive launch opportunities to be assembled at the outpost location.
The Ames Research Center study team (Cohen, 1993) has made the argument that the prime
importance of the surface mission will make it imperative that the surface habitat system be
designed specifically and totally for use on the surface. They argue that functionality of a space
vehicle and a surface habitat will be incompatible. Thus, they disagree with a basic premise of the
current reference mission that the crew will be transported to the Martian surface in their transit
habitat, which will augment the surface habitation already delivered to the surface robotically. If
the crew is landed in a short-term crew lander, there are significant implications from the
requirement that they transfer from the lander to the habitat in a short period of time, thus requiring
that they land in a physical condition that is suitable to that transfer. This in turn, could dictate an
artificial gravity space transit vehicle or other equally severe requirements. Thus, the implications
on total mission design and cost is severe. This disagreement needs to be tested in additional trade
analysis and studies. For the current reference mission, it is assumed that the transit habitat can be
taken to the surface and is usable as habitable volume by the crew. It is probably acceptable that
the habitat be designed for the surface mission, with modifications to conduct the space transit,
rather than vice-versa; this may not be true for systems such as the life support system, for which
zero-g operation is the more demanding.
Operability of the surface habitat will depend upon achieving a new level of human / machine /
environment interaction. In general, the crew will need to be able to carry out their operations with
minimal concern for housekeeping functions, which will be managed by automated systems, and
may have some degree of control by the ground. The crew must be equipped to manage the
systems for all contingencies requiring short-term responses, say less than an hour, because of the
inability for control from Earth due to communication times. However, even in these areas,
machine control of fault detection and automated sating will be available.
The habitat must be considered as a system, not just a structure. Even for the fast human mission
there are two structures that must be functionally linked, the habitat that is delivered to the surface
prior to the arrival of the crew, and the habitat that is landed with the crew. Subsequent missions
can add capability to the initial outpost, and all systems must be designed to be functionally
integrated on the surface. The nature of the physical connections between habitat structures is an
area that requires more discussion and focus. Options include hard-docking of habitat structures,
which would require transportability and adjustability of the structures on the surface; flexible
pressurizable links between structures; pressurized rovers linking several structures; or space-
suited movement between structures. These tradeoffs must be considered explicitly in determining
the evolution pathway for the surface outpost.
Habitat design issues can begin to be understood if the habitat functionality is allocated to Life-
Critical, Mission-Critical, and Mission-Discretionary functions (Table 4). The ability of designs to
meet these criteria will be a significant part of the selection process by which the habitat is chosen.
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A set of preliminary requirements has been advanced for the habitat element by the Ames
Habitation Group (Cohen, 1993). These requirements axe not yet completely compatible with the
reference mission, but form the basis for further discussion.
Table 4.
Life-Critical, Mission-Critical, and Mission Discretionary Functions
MISSION 1 OBJECTIVES
Habitation
RISK LEVELS
Life-Critical
Mission-Critical
Mission-
Discretionary
Science
• None
Proximity
Operations (<2 km)
rovers and EVA
Local Operations
(<100 km) rovers
and EVA
Living & Working
Environment
• Survival in habitat
• Mental and physical
health
• Proximity EVA
(<2 kin)
• Productivity
• Sustained, reliable
human performance
• Recreation
• Extended time off
duty
• Access to greenhouses
• Access to rover
"garage"
Life Support & ISRU
• Open loop
consumables from
cache for 600 days
• Energy generation
• P/C life support
• Cache Restoration
• Energy Production
• CELSS: Waste, CO2,
O2, and food
• Inflatables
• Fuel Production
A reference habitat has been studied at the Johnson Space Center (Figures 5 and 6). The definition
of the Mars habitat concept is sensitive to many mission parameters, including its relationship to
the space transportation system as well as the objectives of the surface mission. The key drivers
and assumptions in defining the habitat are listed in Table 5.
Landing on Mars in the transit habitat, as defined in the reference mission, is a significant issue
which requires more work. The argument against this app.roach is that the primacy of the surface
requirements will cause any scars taken to address a translt mission requirement to not trade well
against alternatives where the surface and transit functions are separated. However, from the point
of view of the crew, there are several positive affects of the single habitat approach:
• The crew can operate the habitat element on its way to Mars, thus eliminating a concern
of immediately relying on a surface habitation element that has been dormant for two or
more years.
• The crew does not have to perform any strenuous physical tasks immediately on landing
on Mars; they have time to adjust to the new gravity environment over a safe period of
time.
• The crew can have a full complement of consumables at hand.
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• The crew can take benefit from the habitat delivered in the previous cargo mission, which
could be hooked into the system in about 10 weeks.
• Crew training is minimized (only one habitat style); training can occur in flight.
• Crew transfer in Mars Orbit is not needed.
• Artificial gravity is not necessary, since the crew will have time to adjust to the gravity of
Mars before performing strenuous work.
Table 5.
Driving Requirements For Habitation Conceptual Design
• The capability for surface exploration drives the allocation of space in the habitat for science
and support of the remote operations.
• A direct launch for a crew of 6 from Earth to Mars in a single habitat, constrained to 50 metric
tons.
• The length of the mission phase for each habitat drives the consumable requirement. Crew size
drives the free volume as well as equipment and consumables.
• The habitat must accommodate the surrounding environment
• Landing several piloted missions at the same site implies a need for functionally connecting the
habitats, probably with pressurized connecting links or hard docking.
• Requirements for food, air and water are fairly well known; most air and water will be
recycled.
• Uncertainties of the environment (gravity, radiation) remain.
• Interfaces with the transportation system, e.g. integration of lander and habitat power systems,
are yet to be defined.
• Mass reduction is an objective.
• Common designs for surface and transit habitats or with lunar habitats are desirable from the
point of view of reducing Mars development and operations costs, and mission risk.
Three concepts were studied to compare outbound/surface habitat configurations with Earth return
habitat configurations. In the current scenario, the Earth return habitat is parked in low Mars orbit
and rendezvous with the crew ascending from the surface (Table 6). Concept A consists of a 9.5 m
diameter vertical cylinder with two habitated floors separated by a bulkhead. A single element
would suffice for the return mission element returning from Mars. The 7.5m design would require
additional cargo and consumables to meet the 600 day surface stay. Concept C is a 6m diameter
element. Two or three of them would be required for the surface stay, but Single elements would
be adequate for the transit legs of the mission. This is a minimal habitat, but was considered
interesting enough to put some additional work into the effort.
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Table 6.
Mars Habitation Concepts
Outbound/Surface
Concept Outbound Surface Pressure Shell Dimensions
No. No.
A 1 2 9.5m dia. x 3 m high
B 1 2 7.5 m dia. x 6 m high
C 2-3 6 mdia. x 6 m high1
NO.
Earth Return
Pressure Shell Dimensions
9.5 m dia. 3 m high
7.5 m dia. x 6 m high
6 m dia. x 6 m high
A mass estimate was made for a Concept C habitat (Table 7) used as a surface habitat. Two
surface interface concepts were also studied. The first case is that of a mobile habitat which can
dock with more than one other habitat, providing a pressurized link. The other concept is to
provide mobility to the lander, in which the landing legs are used as mobility devices. This would
allow two habitats, landed perhaps two kilometers from one another, to be moved and connected
for easy crew IHA access. The landing separation may be dictated by the risk associated with the
impact of an aborted cargo landing, rather than environmental problems of blowing dust or sand.
This is a subject for further analysis.
Table 7.
Mass Analysis of Mars Mission Surface Habitat
Current
Estimate
Life support 6.0 mt
Crew accommodations
Health care
Structures
EVA
Electrical power distribution
22.5
2.5
13.0
2.0
0.5
Communications and information management! 1.5
Thermal control 2.0
Power generation 2.0
Attitude control 2.0
Crew 0.5
Spares/growth/margin 7.0
Radiation shielding ---
Science TBD
Total Estimate 61.5 + TBD
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There are many elements of uncertainty that remain in the definition of the surface habitat (Table
8). The issue of integrating the transit habitat with the surface habitat is described in the Surface-
Transit Habitat Integration section below.
Table 8.
Habitat Issues and Work to be Accomplished
• Human research needs: low gravity and radiation effects; long duration crew performance in
isolation and confinement
• Mars research needs: contamination effects of Mars soil, dust, and atmosphere; human
contamination of Mars
• Technology needs: lightweight structures and electronics, long shelf life consumables, high
reliability components, closed life support systems; crew health systems
• Mass uncertainties: structural analysis of habitat structure is planned to reduce uncertainty
• Surface habitat mobility: docking/berthing of surface habitat elements
• Commonality: degree of common design of surface and Earth return habitats
• Logistics: resupply of surface habitat for future crew missions
• Crew size: need to define crew size based on cost, performance, and risk analyses
• Risks: an analysis is needed to define all major risks to crew and mission
• Mars ascent crew module: can it be sized to augment the Earth return habitat on the return trip
• Earth descent crew module: can it be common with the Mars ascent crew module
(e) Life Support Systems
The life support system for the Mars surface is an integral part of the architecture of the mission,
and must be viewed both in term of its requirement to maintain the health and safety of the crew as
well as to prepare for eventual self-sufficiency of a Mars outpost. Solutions to design issues must
also keep in mind limitations of the delivery systems. The life support system for extended
duration systems must minimize consumable supply and resupply from Earth. Approaches that
address this requirement include the utilization of indigenous resources and creation of caches of
consumables, and highly regenerative systems that reuse consumables brought from Earth. The
availability of consumables in the Martian atmosphere, and potentially from surface or subsurface
deposits, can influence the degree of closure that is adopted for the system.
A conceptual life support system architecture is presented in Figure 7. Indigenous resources
(oxygen, nitrogen, water) are extracted from the Martian environment and provide caches of
consumables for the life support system as well as providing fuel and oxidizer for the space
transportation system. For the first mission, all food and a supply of hydrogen will be transported
from Earth. An experimental bioregenerative life support system capable of providing a fraction of
the food could allow some of the food brought from Earth to be retained in the food cache.
The proposed approach to producing oxygen and other gases from the atmosphere consists of
pumping Martian atmosphere through a reactor, removing the inert nitrogen and argon (about 2%
of the total) and reacting the carbon dioxide with hydrogen brought from Earth to produce methane
and oxygen. Enough methane and oxygen is produced to propel the ascent vehicle from the
surface to orbit. Table 9 gives an overview of the requirements. The consumables are modeled
according to a requirement to provide for a 6 person crew for 600 days on the surface, with no
recycling.
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Table 9.
Atmospheric Volatiles for Propulsionand
Consumablesfor the Life Support Cache
Quantity Required
(metric tons)
Amount of Atmosphere
Required (metric tons)
Methane, fuel 5.6 16
Oxygen, oxidizer 19.4 26.6
Oxygen, air 0.8
1.2- 3.2*Nitrogen and Argon, air
Potable water
1.1
50- 150"
4 ---
Oxygen, for potable water 12.4 17.4
Water, hygiene 120 ---
Oxygen, hygiene water
Hydrogen, methane
106 146
4.2 Earth
1.5 EarthHydrogen, potable water
Hydrogen, hygiene water 13 Earth
Food, dry 2.2 Earth
* The range depends on the atmospheric pressure adopted for surface habitats and the inert/oxygen
ratio. Requirements for inert gases are significandy less if low pressures are adopted.
The above table indicates that a quantity of Earth-supplied hydrogen is required to "seed" some of
the reactions which process the indigenous Mars resources. The Sabatier Process, well known on
Earth, follows the reaction CO2+4H2--->CH4+2H20. Water produced in the reaction would be
either stored in the cache or dissociated to form hydrogen and oxygen. Oxygen would be stored in
the fuel or life support cache, and hydrogen would be recycled into the Sabatier reactor. The table
shows that there is a general balance of the requirements. If enough water is produced to provide
for the potable water cache and a 600 day reserve of breathing gas, and the oxidizer requirements
for the transportation system, enough byproduct nitrogen and argon should be available for the
consumable cache. It may not be feasible to have a complete cache of hygiene water available at
the start of the first mission.
For the long-term system,a hybridphysio-chemical (P/C) and bioregenerative(BR) lifesupport
system isproposed(Fig.8). The BR system can produce food as wellas revitalizeairand purify
water while operatingas a bufferwith significantinertia.The P/C system can be modulated to
provide shortterm controland can be used concurrentlywith theBR system when caches require
filling.The combination of the two provides flexibilityand introducesindependent design
diversity.
There are costs associated with the robusmess of the life support system. Table 10 gives mass and
volume comparisons for various combinations of P/C and BR systems and ISRU systems. The
analysis includes tankage, expendables, spares and integration. Masses and volumes for P/C
system arc based on Space Station Freedom level technology. A packing density of 70 kg/m^3 was
assumed, unless otherwise known. Consumables, spares and expendables were sized for 800
equivalent days (33% contingency).
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Table 10.
LSS Architecture Mass, Volume and Power Comparisons
Architecture Function
Redundancy
Levels
Open loop 1
100% P/C with ISRU cache 2
100% BR with ISRU cache 2
3Hybrid 100% P/C and 100% BR
with ISRU cache
50% P/C and 50% BR with ISRU
cache +200 days consumables
from Earth
2+
Mass
(Mt)
Volume
(m 3)
Power
(kW)*
180 290 0
60 470 7
60 410 60
8O 6O0
54090
67
37
* Power above open loop case.
The large power requirements associated with the bioregenerative system are due to the
assumption that all lighting will be artificial. Natural Martian sunlight may be sufficient to grow
some crops at a lower level of productivity than on Earth. However, new types of transparent, but
highly insulating greenhouse material will be necessary, and new approaches to radiation shielding
may be required.
In general, it is believed that satisfactory P/C or bioregenerative systems can be made available for
the Mars outpost. The major question is whether adequate power can be made available within the
limitations of the space transportation system. Because of the power requirements of the
bioregenerative life support system, it may be necessary to defer the complete activation of that
system to the second or third mission. It would be important to begin the testing of the BR system
on the FLrStmission, but perhaps at a 10% of food requirements level.
For the reference mission, the following characteristics will be assumed:
ISRU - produce consumable cache of water, oxygen, pressurization gases sufficient that a
600-day supply of consumables exists at all times. These caches will be produced and
verified before the first crew departs Earth.
• A 800 day supply of dry food will be transported from Earth on a cargo mission.
Additional backup supplies will be transported with the crew.
The bioregenerative system will be sized and delivered with the capability to provide
nearly 100% of food, air, and water life support requirements. Initially it will be operated
at a reduced capacity, traded down to 25%, limited by crew time utilization. As
additional missions are sent to Mars, operation of the BR LSS will be ramped up towards
the 100% level. At this stage it will be fully providing the second level of functional
redundancy to the overall LSS.
(f) ISRU System
The ISRU system has been described in the previous section. It will provide fuel and oxidizer for
the Mars ascent vehicle and will provide for the caches of life support consumables - water,
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oxygen and pressurizationgases. In earlyreferencemission concepts,itwas proposed thatthe
ISRU system alsoproduce an energy cache,inthe form of additionalCH4 and oxygen to run
electrical generators or fuel cells. It was found that the power required to create this cache was
excessive due to the compounded inefficiencies of cache production, storage and reconversion.
The mass of the storage capacity required for the cache exceeded the mass of a redundant power
system. Therefore, a redundant power system was chosen over an ISRU energy cache.
There are several detailed trades that have been made in defining the ISRU system. The basic
system for producing methane is described in the previous section. In the process that produces the
required amount of methane (5.6 t), only 11 t of oxygen is produced. Because the total required
amount of oxygen (combined as water) that must be produced to meet all requirements is 32 t,
additional processing capacity is needed. This can be done either by running the Sabatier
processor in a manner that throws away methane as it produces water, adding a unit to reclaim
hydrogen from methane, or bringing an alternative unit to convert CO2 directly to oxygen.
Zirconia membrane capable of reducing CO2 to CO and 02 have been operated for long durations
in the laboratory environment and could be effective in the Martian environment.
Power for ISRU requires on the order of 1 kW for each ton of oxygen produced in the 17 months
between the landing of the ISRU unit and the launch of the crew. Thus, approximately 25 kW of
power are needed for the ISRU application. As some of the technology (e.g. Sabatier reactors) are
common to life support and ISRU systems, there may be a resultant decrease in mass for an
integrated system. Furthermore, the propellant production must be carried out prior to departure of
the crew from Earth, while the life support system must operate while the crew is on the surface.
Thus, there may be opportunities to time-share the power system for the two applications, thus
reducing the total mass of the emplaced power system.
(g) Mobility
Mobility on several scales is required by people operating from the Mars outpost. Any time the
crew is outside of the habitat, they will be in pressure suits, anct will be able to operate at some
distance from the habitat, determined by their capability to walk back to the outpost. They may be
served by a variety of tools, including rovers, carts and wagons. On a local scale, perhaps beyond
a kilometer from the outpost and less than ten, exploration will be implemented by unpressurized
wheeled vehicles. Beyond the safe range for EVA walkback, exploration will be undertaken
utilizing pressurized rovers, allowing explorers to operate for the most part in a shirtsleeved
environment, and performing EVA's as they deem necessary.
The requirements for long range surface rovers were presented at the workshop. Requirements to
be placed on the rover included: (1) a radius of action of up to 500 km in exploration sorties that
allow 10 work days to be spent at a particular remote site, and (2) the speed of the rover should be
such that less than half of the excursion time is appropriated for travel. Each day, up to 16 person-
hours would be available for extravehicular activities. The rover is assumed to have a nominal
crew of two persons, but be capable of carrying four in an emergency. Normally, the rover would
be operated only in the daytime, but could conduct selected investigations at night.
A conceptual rover vehicledesignwas presented(Figure9) (Lcmke). The major subsystems of the
implementation include:(I)Cabin/structure;(2)lifesupport;(3)EVA; (4)Power, (5)mobility;
and (6)science.The lifesupportsystem includesdehydrated food,with the water produced stored
and condensed ina dehumidifier,storageof Oxygen; CO2 scrubbed with a regenerativemolecular
sieve.An airlockmust be provided tosupportEVA. The rover willcontaina sciencepackage as
well,but the detailshave not been defined.
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Mars Surface Mission Mobility
PRESSURIZED ROVER CONCEPTUAL DESIGN (p.1 of 3 )
Optional Systems/Payloads
_ Navigator/ Stowage
Crane / Driver
Operator /]
C
Batteries Winch
I
/ 7
Hatch
ECLS
Crane/Hoist/Manipulator Arm/Sample
Collector/Winch/Drill/Scoop
Figure 9. Mars Surface Mission Mobility
Pressurized Rover Conceptual Design -- [L. Lemke]
29
Two major issues have emerged. The first is whether to power the rover with a nuclear system
(dynamic isotope power system) or a chemical system. The above referenced concept has a power
requirement of 40 kWe while moving and 5700 kWe-hrs total, and is within the range of DIPS;
however, there is no requirement for continuous power (when the rover is not in use) and there
may be hesitancy to proliferate nuclear systems. Three chemical systems have been considered
(H2-O2; CH4-O2; CO-O2). All appear to be feasible if tankage mass and volume can be
accommodated. Methane-oxygen engines possess the best combination of mass and volume. The
second issue is whether wheels or legs or tracks should be used. Wheels are the leading option,
representing a compromise between mass, efficiency, technical risk and operational safety.
Propulsion efficiency does not uniquely discriminate between options. Tracks are not particularly
valuable on Mars, based on terrain types observed in Viking images. The theoretical attributes of
legs are attractive, but not yet demonstrated technologically.
Not discussed in this workshop, but nevertheless important, are two other classes of robotic
vehicles, unpressurized utility vehicles which can carry people or cargo, and robotic scientific
exploration vehicles. The unpressurized utility vehicles would find use in local exploration around
the outpost; they could be driven by crew members or could be teleoperated from the outpost. The
robotic science vehicles would be long-range vehicles, capable of traversing hundreds of
kilometers or more under autonomous, teleoperated, or telepresent control, making observations
and collecting samples for return to the surface outpost for analysis.
(h) EVA Systems
The Mars missions will place new, unique requirements on ways of doing EVA and will thus
require new innovative approaches and strategi.'es for accomplishing EVA exploration to meet
these requirements. Mars EVA system objectives are twofold:
• To enable the astronaut to perform exploration, support, and maintenance operations external
to the base or shelter in the geographical and climatological environments of Mars;
• To enable the astronaut to accomplish EVA tasks and objectives efficiently and safely while
minimizing physical and mental stress and fatigue.
EVA tasks consist both of constructing and maintaining the habitat, and conducting a scientific
exploration program encompassing geologic field work, sample collection, and deployment,
operation and maintenance of instruments. Any EVA system must perform these tasks with the
critical functional elements of a pressure shell, atmospheric and thermal control, communications,
monitoring and display, and nourishment and hygiene. Balancing the desire for high mobility and
dexterity against accumulated risk to the explorer is a major design driver on a Mars EVA system.
Because of the unique challenges for a Mars EVA program, (frequency and duration of sorties,
quick turn-around times, necessary dexterity and mobility, dust and abrasion) a fresh strategy for
interfacing the crew with the surface is required. Three concepts were suggested at the workshop:
independent, umbilical, and roving EVA systems (Buckley, 1993).
The independent EVA system is a modified Apollo approach, allowing some regeneration of
consumables and battery recharging to reduce weight.
The umbilical EVA system transfers air and fluid consumables from a transport vehicle, through an
umbilical, to the crew member, with a back-up PLSS used for short tasks not suitable for an
umbilical.
3O
TherovingEVA system(REVAS) would consist of a shirt-sleeve environment roving suit system
to be used for major science and exploration tasks. A pressurized vehicle equipped with dexterous
arms, telepresence and virtual reality technologies, window, lights and cameras, would enable the
crew inside to traverse, observe, test and sample the exterior Mars environments, both hostile and
benign.
The advantages and disadvantages of the three systems were discussed in terms of comfort,
fatigue, suit operating pressures, mobility, dexterity, bulk, technological complexity, and risk.
(i) Power Systems
The Mars surface outpost has a number of diverse requirements. Table 11 presents the current
analysis of requirements for a habitat for a crew of 6, including the P/C life support system. Table
12 presents an analysis of the power requirements for ISRU production of water, fuel, oxygen and
buffer gases. The amounts produced are generally consistent with the requirements called out in
Table 9. The mobility power requirements are shown in Table 13. A possible power profile is
given in Figure 10, which shows some periods when up to 100 kWe of power is required, with
nominal steady state for the habitat of about 60 kWe.
Table 11.
Surface Habitat Power Estimates
Estimated Habitat Power Requirements for a Crew of Six (kWe)
Mode Notes:
Element Nominal Emergency
CELSS 37.00 9.00 * Open Loop in
Emergency Mode
Thermal Con Sys (TCS) 2.20 2.20
Galley 1.00 0.50
Logistic Module 1.80 1.80
Airlock 0.60 0.60
Communications 0.50 0.50
Personal Quarters 0.40 0.10
Command Center 0.50 0.50
Health Maint. Fac. (HMF) 1.70 0.00
Data Mgt Sys 1.90 0.80
Audio/Video 0.40 0.10
Lab 0.70 0.00
0.70
49.40
Hygiene
Total
0.35
16.45
Emergency values
derated from nominal
where deemed
appropriate
Values adapted from
NAS 8-37126,
"Manned Mars System
Study"
* Adapted from MTV LSS trade study, Dall-Bauman, EC7
31
,mOt_ft.'Uce_Eot_0a.o
)
I
o
n
o
_s.
_
o
o
5
i
o
I
rnn"
_LU
O
U'_
_LU
m_b.^
0
.
-
_LU
c)
n
"
z__Z0Z
Figure
10.
Surface
Pow
er
D
em
and
Profile
m
[B.C
ataldo]
32
A number of issues guide the selection of a power systems strategy. These include the risk
considerations, which require that mission critical functions have two level redundancy and life
critical functions have three. The surface power systems should have 15+ year lifetimes, to allow
them to service the three mission opportunities with good safety margins. Transportation power
systems should have 6+ year lifetimes to minimize the need for replacement over the program
lifetime. There are logistics objectives, including reducing the deployment and setup time of
power systems, reducing the power system maintenance tasks, and providing interconnectability
between power elements delivered on different flights. The power requirements for producing and
maintaining life support caches can be met early, which reduces the boiloff of imported hydrogen
and leaves the power system to meet the requirements of the habitat life support systems. The
mobile systems ultimately require power systems capable of providing I000 km (out and back)
mobility.
Table 12.
Resource Production Power Requirements
Resource Production Parametrics
Energy Consumed Kilowatts Required
MWH
Resource Mass (rot)
Element Import H 2 Qty. prod. Excess CH4 CO2 processing 5000 br Prod
Period
Water Cache 3.20 14.40 6.40 1.41 0.28
Fuel per ascent 0.00 26.50 2.46 0.49
CH4 5.80 0.60 0.00 0.00
20.70 80.30 16.0602
Oxy_ncache
Buffer gas cache
Total
0 3
0 2
3.20 45.9
0
0
36
20
140.17
7.20
4.00
28.03
Table 13.
Mobility Requirements (for Power)
Pressurized Rover
• 2-3 crew
• 500 km radius range
• 5 days out- 10 days at site - 5 days back
• Crew alternate on monthly sorties
Unpressurized Rover
• 15-20 km radius range
• 3 hours out/3 hours back plus 4 hours at site
• Primary operation - daily, daytime only
TROV
• 500-1000 km radius range
• Reconnaissance, exploration and science
• Day/night operation possible
10 kWe
4 kWe
4 kWe
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The strategy adopted for the reference mission includes a primary and backup SP-100 class nuclear
reactor with dynamic conversion. Each of these systems is capable of producing 100 kWe. The
habitat is provided with a photovoltaic/energy storage system (Ge/As photovoltaic with
regenerative fuel cell) capable of supplying a third level of redundancy for life critical functions.
This could begin at 10 kWe and grow to 50 kWe over the three mission set.
A I0 kWe DIPS is favored by the power system experts for the pressurized rover. The DIPS can
also provide an additional steady power source for the habitat in an emergency. However, if
methane and oxygen are being produced by a robust power system, use of fuel cells or even
internal combustion engines may be effective in an integrated system, and the diverseness of power
systems reduced.
Mass and volume requirements for the selected power systems are shown in Table 14. If the
photovoltaic system is able to track the sun (more complex operation), its mass can be nearly
halved, at the expense of additional operational risk.
Table 14.
Surface Power System Characteristics
Power System Type Mass Estimate Volume (m 3)
Main 100 kWe SP-IO0 reactor 13 mt (less deployment) 42
with dynamic conversion
Backup Same Same Same
Backup 50 kWe Ga/As with RFC 32.5/17.5 mt (non-track 1020/490
vs. track)
Emergency 10 kWe DIPS Use Pressurized Rover Power System
The photovoltaic system does not trade well against the SP-100 as a backup. The main argument
for utilizing the PV system is that it should not have similar failure modes to the nuclear system.
This is an area where future trades and experience will determine the proper solution. It should be
noted that in this strategy, the use of an energy cache has been deleted and there is no surface
vehicle use of the methane production capability. The economics of this would change if a local
supply of water (hydrogen) becomes accessible.
3. Systems Engineering and Integration of Surface Systems
The totality of systems required to make the surface exploration mission successful is of broad
scope. The key elements are indicated in the icons presented in Figure 11. The key to a successful
Systems Engineering and Integration approach is to systematically relate the functioning of each of
the systems both in concert with the other systems and with respect to the goals and objectives of
the program. Therefore, a successful SE&I will be able to link each system and its requirements to
every other system (including space transportation, ground operations, etc.) and the program
requirements, in a manner that optimizes the whole with respect to some combination of
performance, risk, schedule and cost.
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In order to do this, the surface systems integration team has taken the Goals and Objectives of the
Mars exploration program and the preliminary mission design concept, and has made functional
allocations to each of the surface system elements.
An example is given in Figure 12, where the functions for a telerobotic rover are defined. Analysis
of these functional relations allows an understanding of any areas of confusion or overlap,
deficiencies of stated requirements, and appropriate levels of functional redundancy. Matrices of
functionality against surface system elements, such as that in Figure 13 are useful. These are then
used to identify interfaces and allocate any missing functions. An example of a schematic
interface problem is shown in Figure 14, where the data interfaces are depicted between the
various surface elements. The result of this process eventually will be a set of requirements on
each of the surface elements which can be used to derive the optimum system and subsystem
designs. In addition, the SE&I analysis will include consideration of mission effectiveness models,
whereby tradeoffs of functions can be made between various systems, and risk analyses. Software
tools are currently appearing in the marketplace to allow these analyses to be highly automated.
The reader is directed to the working papers of the workshop for more detail on these issues.
In order to complete the SF__I analysis, it is important to have a Surface Reference Mission, which
is a subset of the overall reference mission that deals with the surface. The purpose of the Mars
reference mission SF_,&I activity is to integrate the components of the reference mission in order to
give an additional measure of reality to the mission cost estimates that will be made in the next
stage of program definition. This reference mission defines the order in which surface elements
are brought to Mars and activated. Table 15 gives the surface reference mission functional
capabilities:
Table 15.
Surface Reference Mission Functional Capabilities
• The surface system is delivered by cargo space transportation system and robotically
emplaced.
• The capability to return to Mars orbit exists on the surface.
• Habitation and resource utilization functionality is established on the surface.
• Systems are activated by Earth-control and remotely checked out.
• Systems are continuously operated and monitored from Earth when human crews are not
present.
• Laboratory functions and backups to life-critical functions arc established on the surface.
• Mobility capability is established and equipment to accomplish science objectives is
delivered.
• Prior to crew launch, the readiness of all surface functions are verified; accommodations are
made to revive any functions which have been lost or degraded.
• The crew performs a complete checkout of the surface systems and performs all required
maintenance and repair actions.
• Science and exploration objectives are performed: lHA science, local science, regional
science, and global science.
• Science data is transferred to investigators on Earth
• Prior to departure, crew checks out ascent element and surface systems and performs
required maintenance and repair
• Surface operations arc transferred to Earth control upon crew departure.
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Table 16 defines the reference mission implementation for the first four landings, encompassing
the initial buildup of the Mars base, the time period between launch opportunities, and the first
600-day crew mission.
Table 16.
Sequence of Functions Performed by Mars Landers
in Mars Exploration Reference Mission
Landing 1
• One of the first three launches has delivered a transit habitat and trans-Earth stage to Mars orbit
• Deliver ascent vehicle, ISRU plant, nuclear power system, backup photovoltaic power system,
hydrogen cache, pressurized rover, bio-regenerative life support system, teleoperable rover and
communication system plus consumables and science equipment.
• Deploy communication system.
• Deploy 100 kW nuclear system >500m from lander, using telerobotic rover.
• Deploy backup photovoltaic power system.
• Deploy ISRU plant; initiate operation to produce liquefied methane and oxygen; propellants
stored in ascent vehicle.
• Deploy biochamber; connect to habitat as appropriate.
Landing 2
• Deliver habitat, backup 100 kW nuclear power supply, teleoperated rover, consumables and
science.
• Deploy nuclear power supply with teleoperable rover.
• Activate habitat and check out (from Earth).
• Monitor operation of ISRU methane production facility until ascent vehicle is full; then fill
Nitrogen/Argon and breathing oxygen caches.
• Go/no-go for launch of crew from Earth - system health monitoring; crew maintenance plan
prepared; propellant and storables cached; early science results from teleoperated rovers; check
out return vehicle and habitat.
Landing 3
• Deliver crew and habitat, EVA equipment, consumables, spares and science equipment.
• Crew acclimates to Mars surface.
• Check out fast habitat and perform necessary maintenance.
• Perform connection of first and second habitat, as appropriate.
• Activate bio-regenerative life support sy.stem to begin producing food and recycling air
Commence IHA activities, including science, habitation and housekeeping/maintenance.
At conclusion of surface stay, load ascent vehicle, verify launch readiness, verify readiness of
trans-Earth system, transfer surface assets to remote Earth operation, and depart Mars.
_rior to First Crew Landing
• The base is monitored from Earth for system health. Maintenance items arc recorded and the
crew spares manifest is added to accommodate maintenance and repair actions.
• The ISRU plant has operated to produce and maintain 5.7 mt of Methane and 20.8 mt of LOX,
both stored in the ascent vehicle tanks; 14.4 mt of water, 3.0 mt of oxygen and 2.0 mt of
Nitrogen/Argon, which are stored at and used by the bio-regenerative life support system.
• Telerobotic rovers are used for science missions, base maintenance and momtoring.
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[. Two cargo missions arc launched prior to the crew to support the SECOND crew mission. The
assets contained on these landers arc available for use by the first crew in the event of
catastrophic failure of the initially emplaced elements.]
First Crew Landing
• The Crew Vehicle consists of a transfer habitat which is capable of both microgravky and
Martian gravity operations, EVA equipment, consumables, spares and science equipment.
• The crew checks out the original surface lab and performs any maintenance necessary to ensure
habitability.
• The crew activates the bio-rcgenerative life support system and begins food production and
atmosphere recycling.
• The crew's transfer habitat is towed to the habitation area and docked to the lab and bio-
regenerative life support system.
: 1I-I science activities commence.
Both pressurized and unpressurized rovers are available for EHA crews to perform science
sorties of progressively longer duration and distance:
m local science
regionalscience
globalscience
• At the conclusion of thenominal 600 day stay,thecrew returnssamples to the ascentvehicle,
verifiesISRU propellantload,transfersthe base toremote Earth operation,and initiatesMars
launch.
D. Space Transportation
The space transportation system consists of a trans-Mars injection (TMI) stage, a biconic aerobrake
for Mars orbit capture and Mars entry, a descent stage for surface delivery, an ascent stage for crew
return to Mars orbit, an Earth-return stage for departure from the Mars system, and an Earth crew
capture vehicle (a la Apollo) for Earth entry and landing. As mentioned earlier, the reference
program splits the delivery of elements to Mars into cargo missions and human missions, all of
which arc targeted to the same locale on the surface and must be landed in close proximity to one
another. The transportation strategy adopted in the Mars DRM eliminates the need for assembly or
rendezvous in low-Earth orbit of vehicle elements and requires a rendezvous in Mars orbit only for
the crew in preparing to leave Mars. The transportation strategy also emphasized the use of
common elements in order to avoid development costs and to provide operational simplicity.
Thus, a modular space transportation architecture resulted. A complete detailed description of the
space transportation architecture would be beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, below is
described an overview of each of the major elements in the space transportation function.
References are provided to the more detailed system descriptions, where available.
1. TMI Stage
The TMI stage (used to propel the spacecraft from low Earth orbit onto a trans-Mars trajectory)
employs nuclear thermal propulsion. Nuclear thermal propulsion was adopted for the TMI burn
because of its performance advantages, its advanced, previously demonstrated state of technology
development, its operational flexibility, and its inherent mission and crew risk enhancements. A
single TMI stage was developed for both piloted and human missions. The stage is designed for
the more energetically demanding 2009 human mission and then used in the minimum energy
cargo missions to throw the maximum payload possible to Mars. In the human missions, the TMI
stage uses four 15,000 lb. thrust NERVA derivative (NDR) engines (Isp = 900 seconds) to deliver
the crew and their surface habitat/descent stage onto the trans-Mars trajectory. After completion of
the two-perigee burn Earth departure, the TMI stage is disposed of in interplanetary space on a
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trajectorythatwill not re-encounterEarthor Mars over the course of 106years. The TMI stage
used with the crew incorporates a shadow shield between the NDR engine assembly and the LH2
tank in order to protect the crew from the radiation from the engines that build up during the TMI
burns.
As shown in Figure 15, the same TMI stage is used in all cargo missions. The transportation
system can deliver approximately 65 metric tons of useful cargo to the surface of Mars or nearly
100 tons to Mars orbit (250 x 33393 kin) on a single launch from Earth atop a heavy lift launch
vehicle that has the capability of lifting 240 metric tons to low Earth orbit (407 kin). The TMI
stage for cargo delivery only requires the use of three NDR engines, so for cost and performance
reasons one engine is removed from the piloted mission stage, as is the shadow shield as it is not
required in the absence of the crew on these flights. For a thorough description of the TMI stage
and the trades associated with its use in the Mars DRM, see Borowski.
2. Mars Orbit Capture and Descent Stage
Mars orbit capture and the majority of the Mars descent maneuver is performed using a single
biconic aeroshell. The decision to perform the Mars orbit capture maneuver was based upon the
fact that an aeroshell will be required to perform the Mars descent maneuver, no matter what
method is used to capture into orbit about Mars. Unlike past mission concepts employing
aerocapture, however, where the Mars entry speeds have been high, and the mission profile
required a post-aerocapture rendezvous in Mars orbit with another space transportation element,
the Mars DRM has neither of these features. Thus, the strategy employed was to drive toward the
development of a single aeroshell development that can be used for both the MOC and descent
maneuvers. Given the demands on a descent aeroshell of the Mars entry and landing requirements,
the delta's to permit aerocapture are considered to be modest.
The descent stage itself, employs four RL10-class engines, modified to burn LOX/CH4, to perform
the post-aerocapture circularization bum and to perform the final -500 m/se. of descent prior to
landing on the Mars surface. The use of parachutes has been assumed to reduce the descent
vehicle's speed after the aeroshell has ceased to be effective and prior to the final propulsive
maneuver. A single common descent stage has been assumed for the delivery of both the
surface/transit habitats as well as the ascent vehicle and other surface cargo. The descent vehicle is
capable of landing -65 metric tons of cargo on the Mars surface. When delivering crew, this
number is reduced because of the limitations of the TMI stage to deliver the same payload to the
higher-energy trajectory required for the crew.
3. Ascent Vehicle
The ascent vehicle is delivered to the Mars surface atop a cargo descent stage, k is composed of
an ascent stage and an ascent crew module. The ascent stage is delivered with its propellant tanks
empty. However, the descent stage delivering the ascent vehicle includes several tanks of seed
hydrogen for use in producing the nearly 30 metric tons of LOX/CH4 propellant for the nearly
5,600 meters/second required for ascent to orbit and rendezvous with the previously deployed
Earth-return vehicle. The ascent vehicle also uses two RL10-class engines, modified to bum
LOX/CI-Ls. The crew rides into orbit in the Earth Crew Capture Vehicle (ECCV) or in a dedicated
ascent capsule. The ECCV is similar to an Apollo Command Module and is eventually used by the
crew to enter Earth's atmosphere and deliver the crew safely to a land landing. An ECCV would
have the necessary heat shield for Earth re-entry. Thus, as in Apollo, it would be heavier than a
dedicated ascent module for delivering the crew to Earth orbit. However, unlike Apollo, the ascent
propellant is produced in situ, thereby substantially muting the impact of the heavier ECCV for
ascent. The advantages of using the ECCV for ascent lies in the ability to eliminate a separate
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system development and the safety/maintainability associated with the crew having access to the
ECCV during their entire surface stay, as well as their Earth-return transit.
4. Earth-Return Vehicle
The Earth-return vehicle is composed of the TEI stage, the Earth-return transit habitat, and the
ECCV (if the ECCV is not the ascent crew module). The TEI stage is delivered to Mars orbit fully
fueled, where it loiters for nearly four years before being used by the crew in returning to Earth. It
uses two RLl0-class engines, modified to burn LOX/CI-h. Again, these are the same engines
developed for the ascent and descent stages, thereby reducing engine development costs and
improving maintainability. The return habitat is effectively a duplicate of the outbound
transit/surface habitat used by the crew in going to Mars, less the substantial stores of consumables
in the latter habitat.
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Section II. Mars Exploration Workshop II:
Issues for Mars Exploration
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II. Issues for Mars Exploration
A. Surface.Transit Habitat Integration Issues
In the initial concept for the reference mission, the objective to design a 50 metric ton habitat for
the surface and a 25 metric ton habitat for the Earth return transit was adopted. Analysis has
shown these numbers to be quite hard to achieve using historical a.pp.roa.ches for crews of six. On
the surface, more than one habitat can be linked in the nominal m_ss:on momer to provide
adequate volume, consumables and reserves. For the space legs, all resources must be contained
within the habitat. Three historical estimates of a habitat capable of supporting six people for 180
days were reviewed (Table 17). It was concluded that masses of 50 metric tons were more likely
achievable than 25 metric tons. However, it was agreed that the use of newer technology and more
specific attention to return habitat functionality could lower the mass somewhat. This is an
important issue, as the mass of the returning spacecraft has the highest leverage on initial mass in
low Earth orbit of any element of the Mars mission.
Table 17.
25mt Earth Return Transit Habitat Assessment
Data Source Mass Estimate Volume
MSFC 48.2 mt 330 m3
JSC 46.5 mt* 250 m3
Boeing 52 mt 350 m3
(Extrapolated with contingencies)
The Johnson Space Center habitat team considered that their Concept C surface habitat design
could be split approximately in half, yielding a 35 metric ton space transit habitat.
B. Space Transportation Issues
The Space Transportation System required for the Mars reference mission includes the following
elements.
Launch from Earth to orbit using a common Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HId.V) capable
of lifting about 225 metric tons of payload to Low Earth orbit. This vehicle sizing was
chosen initially because it had also been selected for the First Lunar Outpost initiative
studied last year by the Exploration Programs Office at the Johnson Space Center. The
shroud size is 10-14m x 30m.
The upper stage on the HLLV takes the payload directly from Earth launch to Trans-Mars
insertion, without stopping for any operational function in low Earth orbit. Thus, the
entire system must be "human-rated."
The upper stage chosen for trans-Mars insertion is a nuclear thermal stage with an Isp of
900 see, which is jettisoned post-TMI.
An aerobrake is used to conduct an aerocapture maneuver at Mars. Because the
trajectories are low or relatively low energy conjunction class trajectories, such
aerobrakes are within current design understanding with little new technology required.
The aerobrake is utilized for aerocapture rather than the nuclear stage because it is the
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same aerobrake used for descending to the surface, and gives no mass penalty, whereas
the nuclear stage presents operational difficulties at Mars.
The same aerobrake used to aerocapture to a high Mars orbit, is then used to decelerate
and land the payload on the surface. Using this integrated approach allows
approximately 60 tons of surface payload to be landed on Mars for each HLLV launch
from Earth.
• The piloted Mars Ascent Vehicle is delivered automatically to the surface and fueled
using an indigenous propellant plant that is integral to the lander that carries the MAV.
A separate cargo mission delivers a fueled (methane-oxygen) Trans-Earth injection stage
to Mars orbit in the fast opportunity, where it waits for the crew to come up from the
surface at the end of their mission.
• At the end of their surface stay, the crew rendezvous' with the Trans-Earth injection stage
in high Mars orbit, then returns home.
This scenario is simpler than previous mission concepts, in that it eliminates LEO assembly and
eliminates Mars orbit rendezvous before descent. Also, it equalizes the requirements on the Earth
to orbit launch vehicle for both cargo and crew, and for the aerobrake on entry and landing on
Mars. Finally, it preserves an element of commonality with current lunar mission designs, in the
areas of landers, space transportation system stages, and surface habitats. It is relatively spare in
its use of HLLV's; only four launches are needed to undertake the fast human landing on Mars.
However, it also depends on the development or demonstration of several new technologies,
including nuclear thermal propulsion, Mars aerocapture, in-situ propellant production, and
automated rendezvous and docking (on ascent).
Several issues have arisen during the course of the study:
The size of the HLLV is beyond the scale of any existing Earth to orbit launch vehicle.
The creation of a new HLLV is viewed as a very expensive proposition and perhaps a
budgetary "show-stopper" because it must be committed to early in the program. For that
reason, an analysis was performed of the potential use of a half-sized launcher. It was
demonstrated that such a concept is reasonable; however it would require approximately
twice as many launches, and would imply some level of operations in low Earth orbit
Because of the relatively large amounts of propellant that must be carried to LEO to
launch the reference missions, it is probable that the mission can be split into cargo and
propellant flights, with refueling on orbit. However, this vehicle also does not currently
exist, although there is some chance that the Russian Energia launcher could be
configured for this use. If the vehicle has to be developed by the United States, it is felt
that the tradeoff between size and cost would favor the largest feasible launch vehicle.
Therefore, the 225 metric ton launcher is retained for the reference mission.
It was adequately shown that the same aerobrake could be used for both Mars capture and
Mars descent. The descent aerothermal environment is less severe than that of
aerocapture. However, the high ballistic coefficient of the lander causes high landing
velocities. Designs with parachutes for slowing descent may be required. Packaging of
the Mars lander inside of biconic aeroshells was also addressed (Figure 16). It appears
that any of the lander/ascent concepts can be fit into a 10 m diameter by 15m long
envelope, which appears to be adequate for cargo payloads as well.
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Biconic Brake Envelope Sizing for Lander/Ascent Stage
_J'_',iff'JAlCG
6.0 (m)
14.9 (m) 7.7 (m)
total 8.8 (m) ,[ to Cg
length dia
8.9 (m)
Envelope Dia = 8 (m) 1
Length up to 13 (m)
Shell dia = 10.0 (m) ___a..-
Figure 16. Biconic Brake Envelope Sizing for
Lander/Ascent Stage m [G. Woodcock]
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Theuse of indigenous methane in the ascent vehicle improves overall performance for
the mission, by replacing propellant that otherwise would have to have been delivered to
Mars' surface. The leverage of the methane production on space transportation system
performance is maximized by using a high Mars parking orbit. It might be further
increased by increasing the mass of the lander with respect to the TEI stage. Designs
have not been investigated which combine ascent vehicle space with the transit vehicle
space in providing for crew accommodations. Methane production facilities also be
gained from its use in the life support consumable production also influence surface
mobility vehicle performance, and the robustness of the life support system caches.
However, additional work on integration of the ISRU system with other surface activities
remains needed. Growth of the system through time could result in further performance
improvements and enlarged caches resulting in greater safety for subsequent crews.
The nuclear stage proposed by the Lewis Research Center could be designed around any
of the four reactor options studied in 1992 (Figure 17). Work done in Russia is especially
promising, with the possibility of higher Isp (-950) at a thrust/weight of about 3.0 (for a
15 klbfengine) being a possible development target. Disposal of the NTR stage at Mars
has been recognized as a requirement. If the stage is inserted into a 1.19 AU circular
orbit, it will take on the order of 1.7 km/sec delta V from Mars orbit, significantly less
(-43.4 km/scc) if disposal is along the interplanetary trajectory but without the
circularization burn. There arc a number of issues of risk and performance that have yet
to be worked out. Table 18 gives the Lewis Research Center's recommendations for NTR
in the reference program. Among their recommendations is to consider dual mode NTR
systems which provide electrical power for the transfer vehicle and refrigeration for
cryogen storage, which can reduce insulation requirements. Another issue for future
.trades is the extent to which utilizing NTR for Mars orbit insertion and return to Earth
unproves the mission and reduces the number of transportation elements. The answer to
this is not yet clear cut. Although there arc three different propulsion modes in the
reference mission (NTR, aerobrake, methane-oxygen chemical systems), all three would
still exist in the LcRC proposal, albeit in different forms.
Table 18.
Reference Scenario Observations and Recommendations (for NTR)
CARGO PILOTED / EARTH RETURN STAGE MISSIONS:
• The NTR has a "very mature" technology database. It has already been tested
(Rover/NERVA) at the thrust, specific impulse, and bum duration levels required for a
piloted mission to Mars. The CIS technology is potentially better!!
• Clustered (2 to 4) lower thrust (15 to 25 klb0 NTR engines are suitable for present "no
MEV/no TEI propellant" split sprint, Mars mission scenarios.
• With perigee propulsion, a "stretched" version of NASA/LeRC's "First Lunar Outpost"
(FLO) NTR TLI stage can be used for TMI applications also. IMLEO requirements to
deliver 50t of surface payload arc -215-220 t (better than 90% of 240 t HLLV capability).
• Using the NTR for TMI and MOC maneuvers increases the IMLEO to -232 t for 50 t of
surface payload. With disposal, IMLEO -227 t and surface payload reduced to 39 t due to
volume limits with 240 t-class HLLV's (with 10 m diameter tanks). Slush H2 can also
improve performance.
"Dual Mode" NTR systems with refrigeration can reduce boiloff, decrease stage length and
increase delivered payload.
With 120 t-class HLLV, a single launch cargo vehicle can deliver surface payloads varying
between 18 t (with disposal) and 25 t (without disposal). The 120 t-class HLLV systems
are "mass-limited."
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The reference mission has a top level approach to risk reduction and safety which appears
sound; however, not enough attention has yet been given to recovery modes in the event
of life-threatening system failures. Principal focus in this argument is given to various
"abort" modes where abort refers to the possibility of returning directly to Earth without
going to the surface of Mars. This is a traditional abort implementation mode for
interplanetary human flights (Apollo), but is a strategy that is diametrically opposed to
the approach of the reference mission, which is aimed at getting to Mars whenever a life-
threatening situation arises. However, the approach of having an integral abort mode for
each onboard system failure, no matter how unlikely will result in designs similar to
previous mission concepts, which could not be afforded. There may be modest changes
to the reference approach which can provide additional abort modes that do not now
exist. These would presumably have the effect of lowering risk, perhaps at some
performance decrement or cost growth. The solution to this discussion is more precisely
formulated risk analyses and mitigation strategies that meet the objectives of the
reference mission philosophy.
There are various arguments that the whole approach to the space transportation system is
flawed. In particular, Gordon Woodcock, an outside reviewer, has argued strongly for a
nuclear or solar electric propulsion-based transportation system. This argument
emphasizes that NEP/SEP is more likely to evolve to a system of low recurring costs to
support a long term Mars development program; could be competitive for the first
mission; has greater commonality with the overall architecture of other space activities;
would introduce new technologies which would be multiuse, including providing near-
term uses terrestrially; has the potential for improving the safety of deep space
transportation; and has moderate development risk. His analysis can be found in the
working papers presented at the workshop.
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III. Working Group Discussions and Papers
In addition to reviewing the reference mission approach to Mars exploration, workshop
participants were asked to address three "cross-cutting" issues: cost, dual use technologies, and
international cooperation. Each working group was asked to generate a white paper to capture the
content of their deliberations. These discussions were not intended to provide definitive analysis
or answers to the issues, but to provide guidance to the mission analysis team that could be used in
focusing or revising the reference approach.
Because the topics of discussion were different for each working group, the products differ
accordingly.
The working group on costassembled theirown setof questionsto address,and proceeded to
convene a "mini" workshop" with presentationsand discussion. Their white paper summarized
both thepresentations and the discussion.
The working group on dual use-technologies created a matrix to display how Mars mission
technologies could have both space and terrestrial applications.
The international cooperation working group wrote a white paper based on the recent IACG
meeting and the workshop discussions.
The following products resulted from the three working groups:
A. Cost Working Group
°
2.
3.
Agenda and Purpose
Discussion Questions
"Cost Credibility"
B. Dual-Use Technology Working Group
1. "Opportunities for Dual-use Technology in Mars Exploration"
C. International Cooperation Working Group
1. "Building International Cooperation for Mars Exploration"
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A* COST CREDIBILITY
Cost Working Group
Hum Mandeli, Chair
Mars Exploration Workshop II
May 24.25, 1993
PREMISE
In an environment where perception can quickly become reality, the current perception and reality
are that support for human exploration of Mars has waned since its peak between 1989 and 1992.
While there are many reasons for this, chief among them are the failure of the previous
administration and NASA to rally Congressional support and the subsequent change of
administration. There are other factors, some created by misinformation, which will inhibit or
preclude the reintroduction of human exploration of space to the national agenda.
One major misperception to be confronted is the cost of the venture. During the "90-Day Study,"
NASA management had little concern for the costs of human exploration. The project leader
assumed that the "Space Exploration Initiative" was high enough on the national agenda to render
cost secondary. Only at the end of the study were cost estimates generated. The results would
have demanded a doubling or tripling of the current NASA budget for up to thirty years.
Development costs exceeding $200 billion were common across the several alternatives
considered. Even the most optimistic proponents of the programs became concerned over these
magnitude of the estimates. Ultimately, when the results were presented to NASA management,
the detailed cost estimates were quickly recalled and embargoed.
But the damage was done. The perception abounded, throughout NASA and the external
community, that costs of up to $500 billion would be required to implement Moon and Mars
exploration. Had the study been concerned with cost from the outset, two things could have been
done to produce more affordable missions: fast, less ambitious architectures could have been
analyzed; and second, the parameters of the cost models employed (which reflect the manner in
which business was done in NASA at that time) could have been modified to reflect a less
expensive management paradigm.
Since the end of the "90-Day Study" NASA has made a few attempts to correct the misperceptions
of prohibitive cost. However, in the current political climate of mistrust, and with the questioning
of NASA's credibility, the opportunity to convey the message that there are affordable options for
Mars exploration may be difficult to create.
If human exploration is to be returned to the national agenda, NASA must create and capitalize on
just such opportunities. And the process must begin with the restoration of trust between NASA
and the policy making bodies governing the future of space appropriations.
Two questions become immediately apparent. First, what must NASA do to regain credibility?
And, second, once credibility is achieved, how can the subject of human Mars exploration be
restored to the national agenda?
It is the premise of this white paper that proving the affordability of human flight to Mars must
begin with correcting the self-created misperception that costs will reach hundreds of billions of
dollars. It has been successfully demonstrated that missions costing only tens of billions of dollars
are feasible. However, these costs may be achieved only under conditions of major change to the
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architectures of the Ninety Day Study, and to the management paradigm employed by NASA in
the development of human spacecraft.
MARS IS AS AFFORDABLE NOW AS IT WILL EVER BE
There are two sidesto affordability:the supplyof resources,and thedemand which ismated by
the venture. If the two are in balance, the venture is affordable. NASA must attack both sides of
the equation, of course, but the supply side, while it may be influenced, is less controllable than the
demand side.
Influencin_ the Suoolv
The supply of resourcestoNASA has reached a plateau,atsomewhat lessthan one-halfthe peak
valuesreached during the 1960's. Unlcss major eventsoccur thatarcbeyond our current
capabilitytopredict,thatsupply should remain relativelyconstantfor the foreseeablefuture.
NASA can influencethe supplyof resourcesboth by restoringitscredibility,and by positively
influencingnationaleconomic factors,such as thecreationand preservationof aerospace industry
jobs. The currentstrategyto restorecredibilitybeginswith small projects(thosecosting lessthan
$I00M and of 2-3 years duration).These small,welldefinedprojectsmust have directapplication
and value to human exploration,and must demonstrate new management techniques and
paradigms. Ifsuccessful,theseprojectsshouldaid inthe restorationof confidence in NASA's
abilityto successfullyperform programs. They willalsoprovide beneficialengineeringand
scientificinformationforfuturehuman explorations.
However, space explorationstrategiesdepending on theincreaseof nationalresourcesmust be
avoided. Considering the nationalbudget deficits,the likelihoodof increasingNASA funding in
the nearterm isextremely remote.
A possibilitydoes existfor theacquisitionofresourcesfrom outsidesources,such as other
government agencies and foreigngovernments. Appendix 1 identifiesome of theadditionalcosts
and concerns associatedwith a multinationalexplorationprogram. Therefore,the strategiesof
explorationprogram management must alsoincludethe levcragingof theseresourcesand a
consciousness of the additionalcostssuch participationmay incur.
Influencin_ the Demand
There arc two ways toinfluencethedemand forresources.One istoreduce theprogram content
or eliminatecertaincapabilitiesof the mission spacecraftand surfaceequipment. This has
traditionallybeen the NASA's firstactionto reduce costs.
But there is a better, if possibly harder, means of reducing demand; reduce costs by changing the
ways in which NASA designs, acquires, and operates space hardware. This involves cultural
changes requiring both dedication and a new set of skills.
The balance of the supply of resourcesagainstthedemands of exploringMars isprobably as
favorabletoday as itwillbe any time in thefuture.Today, the only substantialdegree of control
by NASA ison the costs,or the demands forresources,of the venture. And a major possibilityfor
savingsisin thereductionof the developmental costs,through theuse of low-cost management
processes. In addition,theoperationalcostsof subsequent space programs must be sharply
reduced.
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Additionally, there exists today both a knowledge base and a momentum for the human
exploration of Mars. NASA and the nation have invested a great deal of time and effort in this
venture which, ff lost, will be difficult to recapture in the future. Therefore, it is extremely risky to
pursue strategies predicated on waiting years to begin human exploration. While it is !nevimble
that humans will explore Mars, it is not similarly inevitable that Americans will paruclpate m me
mission. If the United States loses its current momentum, on the likely-false hope that the
budgetary picture will improve in the future, this country will lose a major opportunity, at least for
this generation, and very possibly forever. As a result, the United States must find ways to reduce
costs so that this venture may be undertaken in the coming years.
REDUCING COSTS
The mission architectures utilized during the "90-Day Study" were very rich in content, and
included significant investments in infrastructure for both the Moon and Mars, as well as
expanding the Low-Earth orbit infrastructure. Linking the logic of lunar and Mars explorations
carries with it the hazards of compounding the negative probabilities of both ventures. If the Moon
is introduced before Mars, then the success of the Mars venture becomes totally dependent on the
success of the lunar program.
Proposed architectures should be highly exclusive, providing only needed capabilities at the times
they are required, incrementally phasing from the first modest needs of exploration to the later
needs of colonies.
A proposal has been made that the two ventures be unlinked, and that Mars be given priority. An
architecture is proposed which develops the basic capabilities for exploration based first on the
needs of the Mars exploration. Requirements associated with the Moon may be added as relatively
low cost increments to the costs of the Mars exploration spacecraft and surface systems.
Cultural Chance
It has been demonstrated analytically that the strongest influence on program costs is the culture of
the developing and operating organizations. This influence, relatively speaking, is more dominant
than any other predictive cost parameter, including the size or performance of the mission vehicles.
While a treatise of cultural change is far beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear, however, that ff
there is to be further human exploration of space, it must be done more economically, and that the
major means for achieving economies needed is change to the management paradigm.
The Direction for Cultural Chan_e
Change must have direction to be effective in reducing costs. A significant amount of research has
been done to determine "benchmarks" for the low-cost organizations of the future. This research
has determined that under specific sets of conditions, costs may be reduced by factors of at least
six below the costs of programs developed with traditionai NASA spacecraft program management
practices.
The benchmark conditions are many, but most influential is the relationship between the public
sector and the private contractor community. Benchmarks require that NASA s.tate its requirements
in terms of the performance it wishes to achieve, and allows the compeuuve private sector to
satisfy those functional requirements. Contractor rewards must be expressed and distributed in
terms of results achieved, unlike current practices which base rewards on the evaluation of "paper"
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products or on the performance of the government to "manage the contractor". Contract changes
must be reduced or eliminated. Technologies must be ready by the time the program development
begins. Costs and budget availability must match. And, while less directly controllable by NASA,
stable funding is essential. NASA also needs to examine non-traditional acquisition approaches;
for example, the purchase of commercial launch services based on a fixed price per pound of
payload to orbit. By undertaking these types of cultural changes and innovative acquisition and
management practices, NASA can substantially reduce the costs traditionally associated with
aerospace systems.
Benchmark Examole
To begin restoring credibility, projects must demonstrate, from start to successful completion, that
the principles of low cost management are not only conceptually feasible, but are capable of being
employed by NASA. An insight into the potential magnitude of the cost reductions can be gleaned
from the example of Space Industries Inc. and their Wake Shield Facility.
NASA has already successfully managed small, low cost projects, such as the Wake Shield project
developed by Code C, with a small contractor, Space Industries Inc. (SII). SII embraced an
explicit philosophy to address basic requirements in the simplest and most cost effective manner.
SII implemented that philosophy by deliberately choosing the technical processes and management
style implemented to undertake this project. These choices included some departures from those
of "traditional" aerospace contractors, such as: a focus on performance requirements rather than
technical specifications; the elimination of "non-essential" requirements; a "design-to-operate"
approach that allows the intended use to drive the design; use of a small, matrixed personnel corps
in a simplified organizational structure; streamlining of management, documentation, testing and
other procedures; and use of non-aerospace sources for fabrication and assembly. Moreover, there
was an awareness that success was predicated not only on new procedures, but by a conscious
acceptance of this management philosophy by the entire SII team. Ultimately, the proof was in
the results. When the technical requirements from this project were entered into traditional NASA
cost models, the estimates produced were six times as large as the actual costs experienced.
REBUILDING CREDIBILITY
Credibility will be difficult and time-consuming to rebuild. Even if the current space station
redesign effort is successful, there will be lingering doubts about NASA's ability to manage large
programs, and fear that Mars exploration will be unaffordable. While there is no "quick fix", there
are positive steps NASA can undertake. Initially and immediately, NASA would benefit from
successfully executing the redesigned space station, within cost and schedule projections. Beyond
that, NASA must effectively execute the small projects discussed above. There is, however, a
legitimate concern that success with such projects as Lunar Scout is too small to convince
Congress that NASA is capable of the large undertaking of human exploration. Performing a few
small programs under a low-cost management paradigm is unlikely to constitute sufficient "proof"
for key decision makers and skeptics. How then does NASA span the gap between successful
small projects and desired large programs?
Scaling from Small Pro_am_
One proposal is to pursue programs of intermediate size, between the small $100 million class and
the $1 billion class. These would demonstrate NASA's ability to take on programs of both greater
dollar value as well as technical and management complexity, and thereby provide further
confidence that the principles of low cost management can indeed be scaled to large programs.
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The criteriaforselectingtheseintermediatesized"bridgingtasks"programs must includetheir
relevancetothe main objective,i.e.,human explorationof Mars. They should providechallenge,
and yieldusefultechnologies.They must be done quickly. They must be successful.
Candidates for thiscategory of mission can includeMars sample returns,the landingof in situ
resource utilizationdemonstration unitson the Moon and Mars, the landingof largescientific
payloads on the Moon and Mars, and thedeployment of communications networks around Mars.
A listof organizationalattributesforthesebridgingtasksisincluded in Appendix 2. Any of these
candidatescould be performed fora few hundreds of millionsof dollarsemploying the benchmark
management paradigm.
Other Concerns on the Road toCredibility
As an adjunct to that process of rebuilding cost credibility, NASA must also build its
constituencies. It is widely believed that there is national support for NASA to continue the human
exploration of space. But this support must be identified, motivated and demonstrated.
Once demonstrated, NASA must carryitsmessage toitspaying customers,theUnited States
taxpayers. It must demonstrate that there will be wide direct and indirect benefits to the national
economy. It must demonstrate where the funding will be spent, and where jobs will be created.
CONCLUSION
Beyond bridging tasksand constituencybuilding,NASA has significantwork todo. Some is
immediate, such as learningto say 'No" when projectfunding iscut withouta cortes.ponding
reductionincontent. This typeof disciplinewillminimize the unrealisticostcommltments that
have destroyed NASA's costcredibility.Itmeans NASA may have toforgo certainprojects
because decisionmakers willnot supportthe trueestimatedcost;but itwillhelp NASA shed the
perceptionthatthey arcmerely showing the nose of the camel with itsprojectsand costestimates.
Moreover, NASA must establishthroughout the agency, regardlessof centeror headquarterscode,
common near-and long-term objectivesand priorities.Once done, NASA must simply focus on
the objectives,eliminatethe superfluousdrainson agency resources,perform projectswithinthe
abilityof the currentNASA budget,and be successfulatdeliveringwhat itpromlses. Ifitcan do
thesethings,NASA can proudly reclaim itsplace as theFederal Government's premier "can-do"
organization.
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.COST WORKING GROUP
Exhibit I
Agenda and Purpose
Purpose: To begin the enabling process of proving that human flights to Mars are
affordable now.
Agenda
Introducing Cost Credibility, The Need
Lower Cost Mars Missions
Understanding the Uncertainties in the Costs
Lower Cost Exploration Missions
Benchmarking: Rules of Organization
Benchmarking: Cost Reduction Analysis (SII)
How It Is Done in Practice
Group Discussion
• Review/add discussion questions
• Generate answers/focusing questions
• Identify key points for afternoon presentation
Mandell
Guerra
Guerra
Caplan
Mandell
MandeIl
Bonner
All
2. Discussion and Questions
What are the cost opportunities and penalities associated with a multinational program?
How can costs be distributed amongst international partners with the intent of cost reduction?
What are the risks associated with such an approach?
Which Mars mission technologies pose cost and schedule risk? How can they be developed or
paid outside a Mars program? Where should the balance be established between "dual-use"
mission technology for benefit to the economy and current state of the art ("off-the-shelf')
technology for cost savings?
How can R&D for a Mars program be distributed among NASA Centers without creating
additional integration and administrative cost for the program?
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COST WORKING GROUP
Exhibit 2
Cost Impacts of International Participation
While there are opportunities for cost savings through international participation, there are also
potential additional costs?
• May have costs for communication, travel, and interfaces
• Requires clean interfaces to keep additional costs low
• Need to identify benefit (cost/benefit) of international participation
• Assess the impact of international "trade blocks" on an international mission
• While total mission cost might be greater, cost/nation would be less programmatic risk
• Need to trade off "in-line" tasks with tasks that add mission performance (e.g./surface
systems & experiments) as options for international participation
COST WORKING GROUP
Exhibit 3
Organizational Characteristics for Bridging Tasks
What are the characteristics required for potential "bridging tasks"?
• Establish and maintain a change in organizational culture, rather than being dependent on
the orientation and beliefs of prevailing management
• Must have a reasonable scale/complexity
• Must have shared objectives
• Must have challenging mission
• Overcome psychological barriers and positively motivate people/organizations
• Tasks must have useful products
• Must be in-line with long-term objectives
• One person in charge with the responsibility, authority and accountability
• "Green fields"--new organizations at new locations with new ways/culture
• If new org at new location is not possible, establish skunkworks at centers that report
through unique management chains
• "Can do", imperative-driven organization to replace slow, ineffective bureaucracy
• Produce more product with the same number of people (Less paper, more product)
• Change project management regulations and rules
• Eliminate/waive procurement regulations
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B. DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES AND MARS EXPLORATION
Dual Use Technologies Working Group
Barney Roberts, Chair
Mars Exploration Workshop II
May 24-25, 1993
"Dual use" technologies are defined as those which can find early application in non-project
activities (terrestrial, other space), but which are also needed for a space project. They are
generally emphasized by the current national administration which desires to improve American
quality of life through investments in new technology. Space programs are not spared this
requirement. A project strategy that emphasizes the creation of dual use technologies, besides
consistency with this current trend in Washington could 1) more easily generate funds through
increased cooperation and joint-venturing; 2) provide smaller projects which could be more easily
funded; 3) provide for a "step-by-step" approach to the Mars Mission; 4) provide a stimulus to the
local and national economies; and 5) foster an increase in space advocacy.
"Dual-use" was further loosely defined as a project with any level of cooperation between
government and non-government entities which would produce useful products for both entities.
Levels of funding needed from each entity for a project was not discussed. It was recognized that
the useful information from a technology project could flow from government entities outward,
from non-government entities into the government, or in both directions.
The group took as its charge to 1) choose a set of dual-use technology categories with which to
work, 2) provide technology examples within each category, and 3) provide both terrestrial and
space applications for each technology. The group began by listing technology category
candidates using a brainstorming technique. A final set was approved by consensus. The group
then used a "round-robin" technique to produce likely technologies in each category along with
their terrestrial and space applications. Some discussion took place over the merits/demerits of
these ideas. However, the group did not feel charged to fully critique these ideas but charged only
to create a usable set from which future discussions could be held.
The group listed and worked with ten Mars Mission-related dual-use technology categories. These
can be found in the ten tables which follow. These categories are:
Propulsion
Communication & Information Systems
In Situ Resource Utilization
Surface Mobility - Suits
Surface Mobility - Vehicles
Human Support
Power
Structures & Materials
Science & Science Equipment
Operations & Maintenance
These categories were then associated with a total of fifty-four technology areas along with their
applications. The space applications are found in the right column and the terrestrial applications
are found in the left column.
Constructing such a table was a valuable exercise since it illustrated that many of the Mars Mission
technologies and their space applications do have a connection to terrestrial (economic) use. This
"dual usage" can have a favorable effect on both the local and national economies in the USA. In
addition, a broader use of space technologies in the commercial arena heightens the potential for
building a more favorable opinion of space activities among the public, among business people,
among educators and politicians. In other words, it could increase the constituents who are
favorable to space activities and space expenditures.
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Dual-Use Technology Working Group Participants
Barney Roberts
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NASA-JSC
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Ce BUILDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
FOR MARS EXPLORATION
International Cooperation Working Group (ICWG)
John Niehoff, Chair
Mars Exploration Workshop II
May 24-25, 1993
PREMISE
The sustained exploration of Mars, eventually including the significant involvement of humans, is
one of the most challenging goals of the space program. It is apparent that many benefits could be
derivedfrom pursuing thisgoalas an internationaleffortsupportedby theresourcesof the global
community. Itisalsoobvious thatmany politicalobstaclesneed tobe overcome to realizeand
sustainsuch a cooperativeopportunity.At leasttwo essentialingredientsarcrequiredto createan
InternationalMars ExplorationProgram. First,a significantperiodof time isneeded preceding the
initiativeduring which technology/infrastructureinvestmentsaremade, relevantnational
capabilitiesare clearlyestablished,and the abilitytocooperateon jointspace effortsissuccessfully
demonstrated. Second, a "right"moment isrequiredwhen capabilities,resources,and national
objectivesmerge tocreatea consensus opportunityleadingto themeaningful,sustained
commitment to theinitiative.
MARS INTERNATIONAL POLICY AGREEMENT
Perhaps the largestsingleobstacletoday in moving Mars Explorationforward on the world agenda
isthe lackof any internationalagreement, eitherstatedor perceived,toserve as a basisfor
developing theenablingprogram ingredientsoutlinedabove.
In the past,forscientific,economic or educationalreasons,politicaland professionalorganizations
have generatedand endorsed high-levelpolicyagreements forthepurpose of framing/encouraging
the cooperativepursuitof mutual interests.Examples of such ad hoc agreements includedeep
drillingin the world oceans,explorationof Antarctica,the lunartreaty,and theprotocolfor
planetary protection.
An international policy statement of a similar nature regarding the robotics/human exploration of
Mars and endorsed by all spaccfaring nations would establish a solid foundation on which to build
the prerequisites of a sustained international program. Specific evolving capabilities and
cooperative ventures within and among the national space agencics could then proceed with the
expectation that these efforts could eventually lead to the implementation of an International Mars
Exploration Program.
APPROACH
Given that an international policy statement can be attained to better focus the preparatory
activities of national space agencies in anticipation of the "right moment" for a cooperative Mars
exploration program, what might such activities be? Important among them are the following
tasks:
• Establish an international project design/definition activity to determine the critical
technologies and essential infrastructures;
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• Refine the understanding of required resources to plan, develop and operate the program;
• Create effective cooperation management structures;
• Demonstrate successful joint efforts in relevant precursor activities and/or missions;
• Develop critical technologies and essential infrastructures;
• Seek commercial interests and participation;
• Build political support for a sustained effort.
Accomplishing these tasks puts all participating countries in a more adv .antag_us posi.tion, poised
to implement a sustained international Mars exploration program when me typlcauy onez
"window-of-opportunity" occurs. This readiness communicates to governments and their
administrations, world-wide, that we have done our homework and have a sound plan in place with
tested lines of international cooperation ready for action.
ICWG'S ASSESSMENT OF THE MARS DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION
As a starto the firstaskoutlinedinthe Approach above,the InternationalCooperation Working
Group (ICWG) assessedthecurrentMars Design Reference Mission (DRM) from the perspective
of internationalparticipation.Itscritiqueof theDRM can be summarized by a setof Pro versus
Con findings.
Pro Findings of the DRM:
The Mars Exploration DRM contains a set of precursor missions and demonstrations that
are favorable from the standpoint of "testing" effective international cooperation prior to
the significant commitment of cooperative human exploration.
• The DRM requiresa near-minimum number of system elements,which, inturn,yields
fewer interfaces(technicaland programmatic) thanprevious mission scenarios.
• Since the DRM uses the split-mission strategy for cargo and crew, and builds Mars
surface infrastructure over a period of time, development/deployment of systems is
staggered, resulting in more reasonable (lower) annual budgets during all phases of the
program.
• The program plan of exploration affords many new development and technology
insertion opportunities for various international partners to pursue.
• The sequential deployment of cargo payloads provides full system back-ups to previous
deployments (before nominal utilization), hence reducing system failure risks to the crew.
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ConFindingsof theDRM:
TheMarsDRM demonstrates little or no commonality with a human lunar exploration
program (e.g. First Lunar Outpost); hence, little opportunity is taken to leverage
development and operations experience from a less challenging, but effective
international lunar exploration experience.
There is a requirement for a very large Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle fflLLV) in order to
avoid LEO assembly and staging activities; hence, the DRM ignores the existence and
possible cooperative opportunity to use the Russian Energia HLLV. The Energia has
sufficient payload capability to limit LEO activities to mating fully ground-integrated
payloads with independently launched propulsion stages, i.e., no on-orbit assembly would
be required. Furthermore, developing a new HLLV exclusively for the Mars Exploration
Program would increase cost, require a new testing phase-in period, have vehicle-unique
EIS obstacles because of its size, and increases the impact of launch failures because
entire missions would be carried on each HLLV.
While the number of independent systems are near minimum in the DRM, those that have
been chosen invoke a near-maximum in new technologies right from the start. Nuclear
propulsion, LOX-Methane chemical propulsion, aerocapture braking, ISRU systems, and
advanced life-support systems (including greenhouses) are all part of the DRM. Not only
does this put more cost into enabling developments, but it exacerbates the risks associated
with international cooperation, i.e. you don't understand the technology well enough to
know ff your partners are doing a good job in applying it to their part of the development
task. It also becomes much more difficult to assist or assume other development tasks if
cooperation breaks down, and a critical partner decides to withdraw from the initiative.
Because of the launch strategy chosen (large HLLV with all ground-integration), complex
payload integration activities are required which could be an obstacle to maximum
international cooperation in development, testing and integration of system elements.
Technology transfer could also be a larger problem with this approach. On the other
hand, using smaller HLLV's and utilizing orbital assembly of system elements has its
own set of problems from an international perspective. Ultimately, this is expected to be
a significant trade-off in the definition and implementation of specific international
cooperative agreements.
International Cooperation Working Group Participilrlts
John Niehoff, Chair
Stan Borowksi
Marc Cohen
Chuck Klein
Bruce Lusignan
Marc Murbach
Deb Neubek
Doug O'Handley
Bill Sigfried
Carol Stoker
Dwayne Weary
SAIC
NASA-LeRC
NASA-ARC
Santa Clara University
Stanford University
NASA-ARC
NASA-JSC
NASA-ARC
McDonnell-Douglas
NASA-ARC
NASA-JSC
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Appendix A: Summary of Workshop
A. Overview of Workshop
Objectives:
• Review and critique Mars Reference Program assumptions and content
• Evaluate Reference Program from diverse perspectives
• Identify open issues, concerns
Participants:
• Mars Study Team
• Mars consultant Team
• Invited Guests
Format:
Day One: Presentation of the Mars Reference Mission; Status of the Surface Systems,
Space Transportation, and Habitat Subgroups
Day Two: Discussions and Feedback from the three new Working Groups on
International Participation, Dual Use Technologies, and Cost. Status of Subgroup Issues
from Day One.
Logistics:
• Date: 24-25 May 1993
• Place: Ames Research Center, Building 262, Room 100
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B. Agenda
Mars Exploration Workshop II Agenda
Monday. May 24
8:30 am
9:00- 10:00
10:00- 12:30
12:30 - 1:30 pm
1:30 - 3:30
3:30 - 5:30
5:30 - 6:30
6:30
Introduction D M. Duke
Overview of reference program _ D. Weaver
Surface Mission Issues-Surface Systems Subgroup D G.
Briggs and J. Connolly, team leads
Lunch
Habitat Status-Habitat Subgroup _ A. Adams, team lead
Space Transportation System Options _ W. Huber, team
lead
Discussion and plan for next day
Stanford University Faculty Club dinner
Tuesday. May 25
8:30 am
9:30- 12:00
12:00 - 1:00 pm
1:00
1:30
2:00
3:30
5:30
General Discussion of Issues
Working Group Discussion Sessions
• International Cooperation
• Dual-Use Technologies
• Cost
Lunch
Mars Abort and Architecture Assessment _ G. Woodcock
Stanford International Mars Study _ B Lusignan
Mars Exploration Study Subgroup Reports
• Habitation Issues
• Space Transportation Issues
• Surface System Issues
Working Group Reports
• International Cooperation
• Dual-Use Technologies
• Cost
Adjourn
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C. Presented Papers
Monday. May 24. 1993. 8:30 am
Mars Exploration Workshop II: Objectives and Agenda
IACG Workshop on International Coordination of Mars Exploration
International Cooperation in the Exploration of Mars (paper only)
Mars Study Team Reference Mission Overview
Mars Surface Mission Study
Mars 2008 Surface Habitation Study
Mars Surface Mission Life Support Summary
Mars Surface Mission Mobility
ISRU
Surface Risk and Safety Philosophy
Preliminary Power Systems Assessment
Mars Surface Mission Human Factors and Crew Size
Telepresent Science
EVA Systems
JSC Surface Systems Work
Surface Reference Mission
Mars Habitat Working Group Status/Review
Life Sciences Critical Research Requirements
Reference Implementation Concepts
Space Transportation Systems Working Group
Nuclear Thermal Rocket Stage Technology Options
Mars Aerobrake Studies
Mike Duke
John Niehoff
Wes Huntress
David Weaver
Geoff Briggs
Marc Cohen
Andy Gonzales
Larry Lemke
John Connolly
John Connolly
Bob Cataldo
Yvonne Clearwater
Michael Sims
Theresa Buckley
John Connolly
John Connolly
Alan Adams
Paul Campbell
Nathan Moore
Bill Huber
Stan Borowski
Woody Lovelace
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Tuesday. May 25. 1993. 8:30 am
Mars Abort and Architecture Assessment
Stanford International Mars Mission: Executive Summary
Mars Exploration Study Subgroup Reports: Issues
Habitation Issues
Space Transportation Issues
Surface System Issues
Workshop Team Results
International Participation
Dual-Use Technologies
Cost
Gordon Woodcock
Bruce Lusignan
Alan Adams
Bill Huber
John Connolly
John Niehoff
Barney Roberts
Hum Mandell
D. Charters and Questions for Working Groups
Charters for Working Groups on International Participation, Dual-Use Technologies, and
Cost
I.
2.
.
Evaluate the reference program from your working group's perspective.
Agree upon a prioritized set of studies needed to clarify issues or make needed decisions.
The number of topics addressed should be small (perhaps 5 or less), but should be of clear
priority. These will become the basis for subsequent definition and wade studies and will be
used to define a program if funding is available in FY94.
Document the top 5 issues. The product expected of each of the working groups for each
issues is:
• A description of the issue
• The value of resolving the issue - i.e., its implications on program planning or
mission definition; a defense of its priority
,
• Recommended options for subsequent study
Make recommendations of other personnel who should be involved with working group
activities; links to universities, etc.
8O
Questions for Working Groups
International Cooperation Working Group
• How can the current reference program be allocated between several participating countries?
• What changes to the reference program would enhance potential for multilateral participation?
• What other questions do we need to address?
Dual-Use Technology Working Group
• What are the most promising dual-use technologies included in the reference program.'?
• What mechanisms exist or should be created to validate the dual-use aspects?
• What other questions need to be asked?
Cost Working Group
• What isthecostof the currentreferenceprogram ifexistingcostmodels arc utilize,d?
• How can the actualcostsbe improved with respecttocurrentcostmodels?
• What arc the costbenefit/penaltiesa sociatedwith a multinationalprogram?
• What otherquestionsneed tobe asked?
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Name and Address
Mars Exploration Study Team 10/18/93
Alan Adams
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Mail Stop PT41
Huntsville, AL 35812
Stan Borowski
NASA Lewis Research Center
Mall code SVR/NPO
21000 Brookpark
Cleveland, OH 44135
Roger Bourke
Jet Propulsion Lab
Mail Stop 171-225
Pasadena, Ca. 91109
Geoflel7 Bdggs
NASA Ames Research Center
Mail Stop 245-1
Moffett Field, CA 94035
Jed Brown
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code SP
Houston, TX 77058
Teresa Buckley
NASA Ames Research Center
MPS239-15
Moflett Field 94035
Nancy Ann Budden
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code XI
Houston, TX 77058
Paul Campbell
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code SP2
Houston, TX 77058
Beth Caplan
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code XP
Houston, TX 77058
Bob Cataldo
NASA, Lewis Research Center
Mail Code AAC-2
21000 Brookpark
Cleveland, OH 44135
Franklin Chang-Diaz
NASA, Johnson Space Center
Mail Code CB
Houston, TX 77058-3696
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(205) 544-3607
Fax: (205) 544.5861
(216) 891-2179
Fax: (216) 891-2192
(818) 354-5685
Fax: (818) 393-4679
(415) 604.0218
Fax: (415) 604-7283
(713) 483-8794
Fax: (713) 244.8452
(415) 604-3343
Fax: (415) 604.1092
(713) 483-5509
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(713) 483-9948
Fax: (713) 483-1847
(713) 483-6768
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(216) 977-7082
Fax: (216) 977-7125
(713) 244.8923
Fax: (713) 244-8873
Mars Exploration
Name and Address
John Clark
NASA Lewis Research Center
Mail Code AAC-2
21000 Brookpark
Cleveland, OH 44135
Yvonne Clearwater
NASA Ames Research Center
M/S 262-1
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
Butch Cockrell
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mall Code ET
Houston, TX 77058
Marc M. Cohen
NASA Ames Research Center
M/S 240-10
Molfett Field, CA 94035-1000
John Connolly
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mall Code IB
Houston, TX 77058
Mike Duke
NASA ,JohnsonSpace Center
Mail Code SA
Houston, TX 77058
AI DuPont
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code IA
Houston, TX 77058
Dallas Evans
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code Xl
Houston, TX 77058
Andrew Gonzalas
NASA Ames Reaearch Center Center
M/S 239-23
Mollett Field, CA 94035
Anthony R. Gross
NASA Ames Research Center
M/S 240-10
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
Lisa Guerra
SAIC
400 Virginia Ave., S.W., Suite 810
Washington, DC 20024
William G. Huber
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Mail Stop PA01
Huntsville, AL 35812
Study Team 10/18/93
P_J=mLBumb_
(216) 891-2174
Fax: (216) 977-7125
(415) 604-5937
Fax: (415) 604-3323
(713) 483-9081
(415) 604-0068
Fax: (415) 604-4503
(713) 483-5899
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(713) 483-4401
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(713) 483-5823
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(713) 483-5844
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(415) 604-0309
Fax: (415) 604-1092
(415) 604-6547
Fax: (415) 604-6533
(202) 479-0750
Fax: (202) 604-1092
(205) 544-8102
Fax: (205) 544-5893
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Name and Addrg_s
Kent Joosten
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code XE
Houston, TX 77058
Dave Kaplan
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code XE
Houston, TX 77058
Paul Keaton
Los Alamos Nuclear Lab
Box 1663 MS D434
Los Alamos, NM 87545
Darrell Kendrick
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code Xl
Houston, TX 77058
David Korsmeyer
NASA Ames Research Center
M/S 269-1
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
Nick Lance
NASA, Johnson Space Center
Mail Code XI
Houston, TX 77058
Larry Lemke
NASA Ames Research Center
Mail Stop 244-14
Moffett Field, CA 94035
Thomas M. Polette, LESC
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code IB
Houston, TX 77058
Woody Lovelace
NASA Langley Research Center
Mail Code MS325
Hampton, VA 23665
Humboldt Mandell
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code IA
Houston, TX 77058
Nathan Moore
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code SP33
Houston, "IX 77058
Deborah Neubek
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code IB
Houston, TX 77058
Doug O'Handley
NASA Ames Research Center
Mai Stop 245-1
Moffett Reid, CA 94035 85
(713) 483-5542
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(713) 483-5755
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(505) 665-9985
Fax: (505) 665-2904 or4507
(713) 483-5778
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(415) 604-3114
Fax: (415) 604-3594
(713) 483-0386
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(415) 604-6526
Fax: (415) 604-0673
(713) 483-4901
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(804) 864-8215
Fax: (804) 864-8203
(713) 483-3977
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(713) 483-4308
Fax: (713) 483-1847
(713) 483-5509
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(415) 604-3525
Fax: (415) 604-7283
Mars Exploration Study Team 10/18/93
Name and Address
Cad Pilchar
NASA Headquarters
Code SX
Washington, DC 20546
Brian Pritchard
NASA, Langley Research Center
Mall Stop 253
Hampton, VA 23665
Barney Roberts
FutroNSuite 310
1120 NASA Road One
Houston, TX 77058
John Rummel
NASA Headquarters
Code SL
Washington, DC 20546
Michael Sims
NASA Ames Research Center
M/S 269-3
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
Ed Svrcek
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code Xl
Houston, TX 77058
Dave Weaver
NASA Johnson Space Center
Mail Code XE
Houston, TX 77058
Archie Young
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Mall Code PA01
Huntsville, AL 35812
(202) 358-0290
Fax: (202) 358-3097
(804) 864-8200
Fax: (804) 864-8203
(713) 333-0190
Fax: (713) 333-0192
(202) 358-0292
(415) 604-4757
Fax: (415) 604-4036
(713) 483-4966
Fax: (713) 244-8452
(713) 483-5777
Fax: (713) 244-8452
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Mars Exploration Consultant Team 10/15/93
Larry Boll
Center for Space Amhitecture
University of Houston
Houston, TX 77204-4431
(713) 749-1181 or 643-0094
Fax: (713) 643-7869
Dr. David C. Black
Director, Lunar and Planetary Institute
3600 Bay Area Blvd.
Houston, TX 77058
(713) 486-2138
Fax: (713) 486-2173
Dr. Michael H. Can"
USGS/Mail Station 946
345 Middlefield Rd.
Menlo Park, CA 94025
(415) 329-5174
Fax: (415) 329-4936
Lou Friedman
65 North Catalina Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91106
(818) 793-5100
Fax: (818) 793-5528
Dr. Ron Greeley
Arizona State University
Department of Geology
Tempe, AZ 85287-1404
(602) 965-7045
Fax: (602) 965-8102
Noel Hinners
Martin Marietta
MS S-8000
P. O. Box 179
Denver, CO 80201
(303) 971-1581
Fax: (303) 971-2390
Was Huntress
NASA Headquarters
CodeS
Washington, D.C. 20546
(202) 358-1409
Fax: (202) 356-3092
Dr. Joseph P. Kerwin
Lockheed Missiles and Space
Mail Code A23
1150 Gemini Ave.
Houston, TX 77058-2742
(713) 282-6204
Fax: (713) 282-6227
Dr. Harold P. Klein
Santa Clara University
Dept. of Biology
Santa Clara, CA 95053
(415) 856-2349
Fax: (408) 554-5241
Gentry Lee
5116 Pinehurst
Frisco, TX 75034
(214) 625-3026
Fax: (214) 625-3418
Brace Lusignan
Stanford University
Dept. of Elactrioal Eng
Building ERL Room 202
Stanford, CA 94305-4053
(415) 723-3471
Fax: (415) 723-3471
Dr. Christopher McKay
NASA Ames Research Center
Life Sci Division/Solar System 245-3
Moffett Field, CA 94035
(415) 604-6864
Fax: (415) 604-6779
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Gary T. Moore
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GeorgeMorgenthaler
Universityof Colorado
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Boulder,CO 80309-0429
BobMoser
CononesRd.
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Bruce Murray
California Institute of Technology
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John Niehoff
SAIC
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Comell University
Space Sciences Building
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Harrison Schmitt
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Dr. Steven Squyres
Comell University
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Dr. Steven Squyres
Ball Aerospace
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Boulder, CO 80303
Gordon Woodcock
Boeing Defense and Space Group
499 Boeing Blvd. MS JW-21
P.O. BOx 240002
Huntsville, AL 35824-6402
Bob Zubrin
Martin Marrieta
P. O. Box 179
Denver, CO 80207
(303) 492-3633
Fax: (303) 492-5514
(505) 756-2806
Fax: (505) phone 5#
(818) 356-3780
Fax: (818) 577-4875
(708) 330-2519
Fax: (708) 330-2522
(607) 255-4971
Fax: (607) 255-9888
(505) 823-2616
(607) 255-3508
Fax: (607) 255-9002
(303) 939-6420
(205) 461-3954
Fax: (205) 461-3930
(303) 971-9299
Fax: (303) 977-1893
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